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ABSTRACT
As public transit agencies install new technology systems they are gaining increasing amounts
of data. This data has the potential to change how they operate by generating better
information for decision-making. Deriving value from this data and applying it to improve
service requires changing the institutional processes that developed when agencies had little
reliable information about their systems and customers. With automated systems producing
large quantities of high quality data, it becomes the impetus for, rather than simply the input
to, measurement. Capturing more value from automated data thus involves rethinking what
agencies can know about service.
This research uses the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) as a case study.
It first assesses how the MBTA currently uses real-time and historical data. Based on this
assessment, it redesigns and advances the agency's daily performance reports for rapid transit
through a collaborative and iterative process with the Operations Control Center. These
reports are then used to identify poor performance, implement pilot projects to address its
causes, and evaluate the effects of these pilots.
Through this case study, this research finds that service controllers' trust and interpretation
of performance information determines its impact on operations. It concludes that new data
will be most effective in producing service improvements if measurements accurately reflect
human experience and are developed in conjunction with their eventual users. It also finds
that developing pilot projects during this collaborative process enables new performance
information to result in service improvements. Based on these findigs, this work produces a
set of recommendations for generating useful performance information from transit data, as
well as a specific set of recommendations for expanding the use of data at the MBTA.
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1 Introduction
The world is being flooded with data. According to IBM, 2.5 trillion gigabytes of data are
generated each day, from weather forecasts to credit card transactions to social media posts
(IBM 2013). These records, often referred to as big data, permit an understanding of the
world that is both more detailed and more accurate than previously possible. While public
agencies are becoming data-rich as they upgrade their technological systems, many of their
institutional processes and behaviors developed when they had little reliable information
about their customers or their performance. This is particularly true of public transit agencies,
who until recently relied on surveys and manual sampling to determine how many
passengers they served, where these people were going, how long vehicles took to run routes,
or how often service was on time. Big data has the potential to change the way public transit
agencies operate by providing them with better information on which to base decisions. The
presence of good information, however, is a necessary but insufficient condition for physical
improvements to service. Improving an agency's operations also requires understanding how
to make this information meaningful to those in control of service and how to make old
institutional processes responsive to new information.
This research focuses on Boston's Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) as a
case study of a data-rich agency that has not fully integrated new information into its
operations. In the past decade the IMBTA has installed new systems that produce detailed
data about where vehicles are (Automatic Vehicle Location, or AVL) and where customers
enter the system (Automated Fare Collection, or AFC). The primary use of AVL data has
been to facilitate real-time service management, while AFC has been aimed at improving
revenue management. More recently, vehicle locations and arrival times have also been
released publicly (NECN 2010). The general customer satisfaction with this information has
generated enthusiasm from the state Secretary of Transportation. His desire to do more with
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the MBTA's data was the genesis of this work. The MBTA knows more about performance
in the moment than performance in the past; its use of logged data has been limited. The
agency could use its data to better understand trends, learn from them, and make
improvements. But the agency is a bureaucratic organization that relies on human action,
human perception, and existing institutional processes, which constrains the use of such data.
The MBTA provides an opportunity to explore how to make data useful within the existing
constraints faced by a U.S. public transit agency.
This research assesses the MBTA's current use of both real-time and historical data. Based
on this assessment, it redesigns the agency's daily performance reports for rapid transit. By
collaborating with MBTA personnel, it attempts to determine how MBTA employees
interpret information and what they need to impact decisions about service. These reports
are used to identify poor performance and develop pilot projects to address its causes.
Because both the performance reports and pilot projects are developed within the
institutional constraints of service management, these projects have been successfully
implemented. Their positive impact on service has led them to be extended beyond their
initial phase.
This research shows that when a system is run by humans, the interpretation and use
performance information is influenced by (1) how data is translated into performance
metrics and (2) the process of choosing the metrics. This in turn affects how the information
is incorporated into the management of the system and thus how it can ultimately impact an
agency's operations. Through its case study of the MBTA, this work concludes that big
transit data will be most effective if the measurements developed from it accurately reflect
human experience and are developed in conjunction with their eventual users. Based on
these findings, it produces a general set of recommendations for creating useful performance
information from big transit data, as well as a specific set of recommendations for expanding
the use of data at the MBTA.
1.1 The Age of Big Data and the Public Sector
Over the past several decades the introduction of information and communications
technology (ICY) into many parts of society has exponentially increased the amount of data
collected about the world. These technologies are logging information that has the power to
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change how human beings understand the systems, processes, and events that impact their
existence. The increasingly common presence of sensors and electronic transactions is
creating a frequent record of the systems that people use in their daily lives. This in turn is
making it easier to learn more about the world we live in and make more informed decisions
about how to influence it. Urban planners (Evans-Cowley 2011) and ICT experts (Falconer
and Mitchell 2012) have posited that this wealth of new information has the potential to
transform how cities are managed and how their denizens interact with them.
Analyzing, interpreting, and applying knowledge from big data has been a key to success for
many different organizations. Hedge funds and other new investment entities analyze market
data along with other trends to predict and take advantage of market fluctuations. The
Internet giant Google frequently tests new strategies through randomized trials where
different users see slightly different content. The company then analyzes the results for
patterns, trends, and correlations, which informs the final design or product (Christian 2012).
The Obama campaigns in both 2008 and 2012 analyzed voter data in great detail, which
allowed more targeted and effective campaigning (Issenberg 2012). In all of these examples,
the ability to analyze and draw conclusions from big data produces a competitive advantage
that contributes to the success of the organization.
Public agencies have not been left out of this trend. They are also getting more data about
customers and their behavior, particularly in the transportation sector. However, the nature
of the data varies by mode. The auto system, which is dominated by local roads, has a
limited - though growing - amount of information. Traffic monitoring data from loop
detectors, satellites, and roadside sensors provide detailed information about road use and
congestion in real-time to both managers and drivers. However, these systems only provide
aggregate information; they do not track individual behavior. Electronic tolling, by contrast,
produces detailed information about where individual vehicles enter and exit toll facilities,
whereas they previously only knew aggregate entries and exits at each interchange. Most
information on how people are traveling in cars, however, is based on household travel
surveys, which are costly and disaggregate analysis often limited by a small sample size. Real-
time location data from GPS both in vehicles and smartphones has the potential to provide
more detailed information on individual travel behavior. Transportation agencies have begun
to obtain detailed location data through GPS-based household travel survey devices and
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research is advancing in using GPS signals for other devices to observe travel behavior
(Chen, et al. 2010). However, these are still samples that require participant consent. The
New York Police Department is implementing a project to record the license plate number
of every vehicle entering and exiting Manhattan (Sledge 2013), a technology that has the
potential to provide public agencies with more detailed vehicle travel patterns. However,
comprehensive data from license plate data on auto origins and destinations would require a
more expansive installation, which may face privacy concerns.
Bike share systems, which came into existence in the digital age, are the opposite case. Their
operations are dependent on the provision and analysis of big data. Customers are uniquely
identified so individual behavior can be tracked. Bike availability and station capacity are
electronically monitored and provided to customers via mobile applications. Real-time data
on station capacity is combined with historical information about demand at different times
of day to determine when and where bikes need to be moved by rebalancing trucks.
Public transit agencies are between these two extremes in terms of what they know about
their customers. Electronic fare collection technologies record the boarding station (off-
board fare collection) or vehicle (on-board fare collection) for each customer. Systems that
require exit validation (like London's Underground or Washington D.C.'s Metro Rail) also
record data on where customers exit. New dispatching technologies display vehicle positions
at all times, and also log and archive them. This data can be used to inform management
decisions in real time, such as holding or re-routing service due to delays. Real-time
information can be also provided to customers to give them more information before and
during their trips (Wilson 2012).
Public agencies have not been as thorough in analyzing historical data and applying it to
improve their operations as private companies. They do not know as much about their
customers, and their customers do not know much about them. This may be because they
are not subject to competition like private sector companies or politicians. Many transit
agencies existed prior to the availability of comprehensive data. They developed planning
procedures and operating behavior in a context without good information about the service
they were providing or the customers they were serving. Knowing the distribution of trip
times to schedule a route required analyzing manual records of terminal departures and
14
arrivals. These were expensive and time-consuming to collect, and subject to human error.
With automatic vehicle location, running times are calculated automatically for each trip and
can be easily analyzed. Knowing how many passengers were on a bus or train required
manual sampling with ride checkers. Now automated systems count boardings on every trip,
providing census rather than sample data and allowing for more detailed and reliable analyses.
Agencies can thus substitute automated data into their existing analysis processes (Wilson
2012). Despite vast increases in the quantity and quality of data, however, they may not go
beyond this to use data any differently than when it was limited. Customers, on the other
hand, are getting more information about many other goods and services they purchase, and
thus may expect it from transit as well.
Getting more information out of this data and applying this information to impact service
requires changing the institutional processes of data analysis and use. Data was previously a
limitation on analysis. It was often time consuming and costly to collect. With automated
systems and their large quantities of high quality data, it can be an impetus for rather than
simply an input to analysis. In addition to "What data do I need to answer this question?"
automated data allows agencies to ask, "What can I do with the data that I already have?"
Capturing more value from automated data goes beyond replacing the inputs to existing
analyses. It involves rethinking what can be analyzed and where data can be applied to
improve operations.
Big transit data has the potential to improve agencies' service provision and customer
satisfaction. The data advantage that transit has over the auto system could be leveraged to
streamline operations and tailor service to attract more riders, potentially bolstering transit's
share of the market.
1.2 The MBTA: A Case Study of Big Data in Public Transit
The MBTA is one of the fortunate transit agencies for which the age of big data has arrived.
Substantial investments in new technological systems such as AVL, Automatic Train
Operation (ATO) provide information about the system to dispatchers in real-time. Despite
these "automated" and "automatic" systems, the service is still run by humans. This means
that to influence physical outcomes, information must be interpreted and applied by people.
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The MBTA's current use of the data from these systems has focused on real-time
management, but they are also continuously archiving detailed information about the transit
network. Providing bus and rail dispatchers with vehicle locations 'in real-time gives MBTA
personnel an understanding of their network at a point in time. This enables more informed
decisions about operations control - holding a train to space out service or advancing a
departure from the terminal to free up a platform for an incoming train. More recently, the
agency has also begun providing real-time information to customers, who previously had
little information beyond the published schedule and what they can see or hear at the stop or
station. In 2010, the MBTA opened a real-time feed of bus and train locations to developers
(NECN 2010), who have created dozens of bus and train arrival apps. In 2012, the agency
began providing real-time train arrival predictions in many of its heavy rail transit stations
(on what are commonly called countdown signs). It also makes commuter rail vehicle
locations and predicted arrival times available online and to developers. In this way, the
MBTA's data systems have substantially increased the amount of information available to
both service controllers and customers. These inform both sets of users' decisions and
change the way they interact with the transit system.
The use of historic data to learn about trends and issues over longer periods of time,
however, has been limited. The agency currently creates on-time performance (OTP) reports
for bus and rail on a daily basis for internal use, and publishes a monthly performance report
for the public. It does not, however, regularly use this data to further assess the causes or
potential remedies for poor performance, despite having internal reporting systems capable
of doing so. A notable exception is the recent detailed analysis of vehicle running times to
revise vehicle schedules based on more accurate information. University students and
consultants have analyzed the MBTA's data and provided constructive recommendations
about service in past research. This work has produced some operational changes, though
fewer than what have been proposed.
The MBTA provides a case where big data is available, but has not yet been harnessed to
feed back into service provision. While the data has been analyzed, the fact that few changes
have resulted from such analyses suggests that the problem is not solely analytical. It thus
1 All heavy rail and bus vehicles. The Green Line and Mattapan line light rail do not have real-time vehicle
locations at the time of this writing, though a project to implement this is underway.
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provides an opportunity to explore the other factors influencing the ability of big data to
impact public transit operations, and how to overcome current limitations.
1.3 Role of This Research
Working with the MBTA as a case study, this research explores how to make data analysis
more influential in transit operations. It rethinks not only the analytical methods but also
where and how information is created and applied within the organization. This work turns
to the Data-Information-Knowledge-Wisdom (DIKW) continuum for thinking about how
transit data can become knowledge for management. Desctibed in more detail in Chapter 2,
the DIKW continuum is a conceptual framework for understanding how data - unorganized
observations or facts about the world - become meaningful and useful knowledge (and
eventually wisdom) that humans can apply to make decisions and influence their
environment. It also looks at past work on innovation in the public sector to understand the
constraints and opportunities for introducing change in a public agency like the MBTA.
Translating data into information that is understandable to people has been one focus of
past research, and many quantitative methods have been developed to accomplish this.
Because people take information as an input into their actions, the effect of better
information depends on their interpretation of its value and meaning. After assessing the
MBTA's current use of big data, this research finds that real-time information has changed
the way service is managed. Historical reporting based on this data, however does not have a
significant impact on operations. In evaluating the MBTA's current OTP reports, this
research finds that the reports for rail are ineffective because they do not accurately measure
service. The reports for buses measure service more accurately, but are too numerous and
lengthy. This hinders interpretation and limits the ability of staff to identify problems and
opportunities. Past attempts to produce service changes by analyzing data have not been
implemented due in part to insufficient attention to institutional constraints and processes.
One implicit assumption in past research has been that conducting an analysis and
presenting the results to those in control of service provides sufficient motivation to change
service. This work takes a different approach: performing data analysis in conjunction with
service controllers through a collaborative and iterative process. It solicits their response to
information and incorporates their input. Through this process, this work revises the
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measurements and their presentation. It reorients performance metrics for rapid transit
around passengers by combining data from two sources: vehicle location and fare collection.
Close attention is paid to making information clear and legible, while still retaining
appropriate detail to underlie management decisions. This process reveals the institutional
limitations to applying information, which include poor interdepartmental communication, a
lack of time and staff to do analysis and look for solutions, and a distrust of information
with unclear origins. It does not, however, bring this data "full-circle" by releasing it to
customers so they can see a quantification of their experience on the MBTA.
The original intent of this work was to produce information for passengers that provides
more insight into MBTA service than their everyday experience. New performance reports
were developed with public viewers in mind. These reports were more detailed than the
iMBTA's internal reporting tools, and were shown to operations staff so that they would
understand and have input into what the public sees. Providing better information internally
then became the priority for this research, so that operations staff could manage service to
the measures being made public. As the detailed reports evolved, some areas of poor service
became apparent. The research then expanded to from performance reporting to using the
reports to produce service improvements.
Having established a relationship with the operations control center while developing new
performance reports, this research proposed two service improvement projects that were
successfully piloted and eventually implemented. These include (1) rescheduling the MBTA's
busiest line, the Red Line to better coordinate northbound service and (2) staffing addition
personnel at its northern terminus to speed turnarounds and reduce delays in the PM peak.
This research hypothesizes that three factors enabled the data to be translated into service
improvements: (1) changing the way service was measured, (2) changing how these
measurements were presented, and (3) developing them in close coordination with the their
eventual users.
1.4 Implications
This research looks at the human and institutional dimensions of making big data matter for
transit agencies. It has successfully redesigned heavy rail performance reports for the TMBTA
and has piloted two service improvements that were initially successful and have been
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extended (and may become permanent). It provides the MBTA and other transit agencies
with suggestions about how to turn their big data into information and how to apply it to
change service. It finds that competent data analysis is not sufficient to lead to operational
changes, and that the human interpretation of and reaction to information must be
considered.
This work concludes that performance information should be developed not only based on
the input of upper management but also those actually in charge of service. To have an
impact, information needs to be meaningful to and trusted by those in direct control of
service. Incorporating their feedback helps to ensure this. Design and presentation also play
key roles in enabling service controllers to draw useful conclusions from performance
information.
This research also finds that developing pilot projects during the collaborative information
design process can be a successful strategy to produce changes in service. Pilot projects and
performance reports reinforce one another: the reports make an initial case for a pilot
project, and implementing the pilot shows how performance information can be used to
impact and improve operations.
1.5 Organization of This Research
Chapter 2 will discuss the DIKW framework along with examples of how past work on
transit performance measurement fit into it. It will also discuss past research on successful
innovation in public sector bureaucracies, moving beyond knowledge to action.
Chapter 3 introduces the MBTA and assesses its current applications of automated data. It
identifies the successes and shortcomings of the existing practice, which form a basis for
redesigning the MBTA's performance reports for heavy rail.
Chapter 4 describes the process of developing new performance reports for the MBTA's
heavy rail services. It focuses not only on changing how service is measured, but also how
these measurements are presented. It emphasizes the benefits of collaborating with the
TMBTA's Operations Control Center (OCC) and how their input has improved the end
product.
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Chapter 5 details how this performance information has been applied to modify service
through two pilot projects conceived and implemented in coordination with the OCC. It
discusses both the institutional process of designing and implementing the pilots - how
institutional resistance to change has been overcome - and the resulting impact on service.
Finally, Chapter 6 draws lessons from the experiences related in the previous chapters and
provides a set of recommendations about applying the findings of this research to additional
operations within the MBTA and at other transit agencies.
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Theoretical Framework and
Previous Research
Automated Data Collection Systems (ADCS) accumulate millions of records every day, but
these alone do not provide much value to transit operators. This research employs the Data-
Information-Knowledge-Wisdom (DIKW) hierarchy as a framework for thinking about the
use of data in public transit agencies. This chapter explains the DIKW concepts and then
reviews past work on ADCS and transit performance within this framework. The literature
on transit performance has developed a variety of tools and methods for extracting meaning
from ADCS data. In some cases, the application of these methods to analyze ADCS data has
resulted in changes at transit agencies, while in others it has not.
To gain insight into what contributes to some performance information being successful in
generating change and some not, this research turns to work on performance management
and innovation in the public sector. This literature discusses how public agencies have been
able to modify their operations despite institutional resistance to change. The literature also
proposes several characteristics of successful innovation that help explain why this research
was successful in making changes at the MBTA. These include: alleviating widely-recognized
problems, finding support at multiple levels of the institution, being close to those in charge
of service, and being open to feedback.
There is little research linking these two bodies of literature, exploring how to leverage data
to make institutional progress. None of the literature reviewed examines how the process,
design, and institutional context of performance measurements influence the capacity for
and effectiveness of performance management. This research to begins to address this gap.
2.1 The Data-Information-Knowledge-Wisdom Hierarchy
Though the terms data and information or knowledge and wisdom are synonyms for one
another in common parlance, in information science and knowledge management each of
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these four words represents a distinct concept. These concepts are often arranged in a
hierarchy intended to represent how humans come to understand the world. A study by
(Rowley 2007) reviews the information science and knowledge management literature and
summarizes definitions of the four concepts in the DIKW hierarchy. This chapter draws on
Rowley's review to define the concepts data, information, knowledge, and wisdom in the
public transit context.
Data is the base of the hierarchy, the foundation on which information, knowledge, and
wisdom are built. Data are defined as events, observations, or other facts that are discerned
and/or recorded either by people or machines (Rowley 2007). Data are usually described as
unorganized and unprocessed, having little meaning because they lack context and relation
to one another. Examples of data in the transit context are records of a vehicle locations in
the time and other identifying information from the AVL system. This data tells an agency
where a vehicle was at a given point in time. Without organizing the records and relating
them to one another, there is no further detail about a vehicle's path, how long it took to get
between two points (running time), or the spacing of vehicle arrivals at a stop (headway).
These latter concepts are information that can be created from transit data. Information is
generally described as data that have been formatted, organized, processed, aggregated,
calculated, and otherwise manipulated, and which then take on meaning, value, or usefulness
(Rowley 2007). The fundamental concepts defining information are structure and meaning,
which the raw factual signals or observations lack. Human action is required to manipulate
data so it describes something beyond what the initial observations and signals show.
Continuing with the AVL example above, the path, travel time, and headway are all
information that results from relating AVL data points. This information is useful for
describing the characteristics of a bus trip, for example. Combining multiple pieces of
information produces information, such as the average running time for a route or the
distribution of headways. Both a single headway and the distribution of headways are
information. They both relate data and have value, but describe different aspects of service.
What the information describes influences what knowledge can be derived from it.
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DATA
Signals/Observations/Records
Computation
INFORMATION
Understanding facts & context
(who/what/where/when)
Inter pretation
KNOWLEDGE
Understanding relationships & interactions
(how/why)
Accumulation
WISDOM
Understanding potential outcomes,
consequences
Figure 1: Summary of the DIKW Framework
The distinction between information and knowlege is more subjective than that between data
and information. Rowley found that definitions of knowledge are more complex and various
than those of either data or information. Many sources portray knowledge as personal and
subjective. One of the texts she reviewed notes that "While data is a property of things,
knowledge is a property of people that predisposes them to act in a particular way" (Boddy,
Boonstra and Kennedy 2005). Rowley's review suggests that information is transformed into
new knowledge through understanding its relation to other information and existing
knowledge (Rowley 2007). A synthesis of the various definitions of knowledge is
understanding relationships and interactions among different pieces of information in a way
that permits one to take action. It is understanding what the problem is, what can be done
about it, and how an action will address it. This action-oriented definition of knowledge will
be employed in this research. For example, knowing the headway or the distribution of
headways for a particular route and relating it to the scheduled headway provides
information about whether the route is running well. Combining this with information about
on-time departures, traffic, and incidents creates knowledge about what may be causing
unscheduled variation in headways, allowing one to propose potential solutions.
While moving from data to information is computational, moving from information to
knowledge is interpretational. The knowledge that one can gain depends on what
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information is available and how it is presented. This transition is more of an art than a
science -meaning hinges on the response of the viewer. While turning data into information
relies primarily on mathematics and programming, creating knowledge from information
relies on human perception. Two people can interpret the same information differently,
which is why knowledge generation is described as subjective. In an institutional setting, this
process may be circumscribed both by the decisions about what information to supply and
instructions on how to interpret it. Developing new knowledge may thus require changing
institutional norms around information.
In many of the texts reviewed in Rowley's study, knowledge was the pinnacle of the
hierarchy, the highest level of understanding. Only three of the 16 textbooks in Rowley's
review included wisdom in their hierarchy. These three definitions all focus on the generalized
nature of wisdom, which allows one to react and apply knowledge to new situations. The
texts do not provide much insight into the generation of wisdom, except that it is
accumulated knowledge. While knowledge is understanding a specific situation and being
able to influence it, wisdom is being able to apply knowledge generated in one context to a
new situation. In the transit context, wisdom is what enables dispatchers to manage service.
From their experience they derive knowledge of the causes of poor performance and the
effects of their actions. The accumulation of this knowledge constitutes wisdom about the
performance of the system and their ability to influence it. This wisdom allows dispatchers
to react to new situations as they arise.
Figure 2, from (Rowley 2007), is a representation of the DIKW hierarchy. Rowley adds two
High Low
Meaning
Applicability
Transferability Computer Input
Value Programmability
Human Input
Structure
Low High
Figure 2: Pyramid representation of the DIKW hierarchy, from Rowley (2007)
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continua to the pyramid: the continuum on the left shows characteristics that increase in the
transition from data to wisdom while the continuum on the right show characteristics that
decrease. This conceptualization reinforces the idea that data are raw representations of the
world around us, which through structure and interpretation become intelligence that allows
humans to understand and influence the world. Additionally, as human input, value, and
applicability increase, programmability and computer input decrease. It is fairly easy to create
automated processes for creating information from data; it is more difficult to automate the
creation of knowledge.2
2.2 Past Work on ADCS in the Transit Context
The introduction of ADCS in the transit industry has been accompanied by a wealth of
research on how the data can be used to gain insight into service, a small fraction of which
will be reviewed in this chapter. Wilson (2012) provides a general overview of the
information that can be generated from ATL and AFC data:
e Detailed characterizations of route segments and running times;
* Detailed characterizations of stop activity;
* Detailed characterizations of passenger activity.
In providing guidance on developing performance management plans for transit agencies,
Transit Cooperate Research Program (TCRP) Report 88 (2003) provides a comprehensive
list of performance measurements for public transit systems and how to calculate them.
While these could be calculated with manual data, automated data allows system
performance to be measured in much finer detail and at much lower marginal cost (Wilson
2012). TCRP Report 88 includes hundreds of possible performance metrics. The most
pertinent that can be calculated readily from AVL3 and AFC data are listed in Table 1 below.
2 This, however, is the objective of artificial intelligence
3 In this table, AVL is used to describe any system showing vehicle location, not just GPS-based bus tracking.
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Delay
Excess wai
Big Gaps
Measurem
Frequency
On-time P
Schedule
Service Re
Missed Tri
Running ti
Run-Time
Passenger
Travel Tim
Travel Tim
2.2.1 Use of ADCS for Performance Metrics in Transit Agencies
New York City Transit calculates a "wait assessment" metric that is a measure of service
regularity. It is defined as the number of headways that are less than 125% of the scheduled
headway (MTA 2013), which is the inverse of a big gap metric. The agency sets targets for
wait assessment in addition to terminal on-time performance (OTP) to manage service. The
London Underground uses travel time and its variability to judge service quality. Its Journey
Time Metric (JTM) calculates customers' time between entering the system to leaving (since
they must validate on both entry and exit). To capture variability, the JTM is compared to a
scheduled value for that trip, based on scheduled headways and running times for the trains
plus assumed access, egress, and interchange time (Uniman, et al. 2010). The difference is
the Excess Journey Time (EJT), which the Underground managers use to evaluate service.
26
ent Definition/Calculation
/ Headway Number of vehicles or time between vehicles
erformance / Departure/arrival of a vehicle relative to its
Adherence schedule
gularity Percentage of trips that operate within a
specified range of the scheduled headway
ps Scheduled trips not run
me Time for vehicle to move between two points
Ratio Ratio of observed to scheduled run time
Load Number of people on a vehicle
e (passenger) Time for a passenger to go from origin to
destination
e variability Variability in travel time, measured as
standard deviation, coefficient of variation, or
other distribution statistics
factor Percent of trips that are within a specified
percentage of the average travel time
Actual run-time minus scheduled run time
t time Number of passenger-minutes of wait time
greater than expected wait time
Headways over a specified threshold
Table 1: Performance Measurements That Can Be Calculated From
Data System
AVL
AVL
AVL
AVL
AVL
AVL
AFC
AVL & AFC
AVL & AFC
AVL & AFC
AVL
AVL & AFC
AVL
ADCS
2.2.2 Work Focusing on Translating ADCS Data into Performance Information
Automated data is still relatively new, so research is still developing new analytical and
computational methods for drawing useful information out of it. Barry et al. (2002) use AFC
data for the New York City Subway, where passengers are only recorded on entry, and infer
destinations based on the sequence of entries over the course of a day. Building on this,
Gordon combines AVE and AFC data to infer origins, destinations, and transfers for
passengers in London's entire public transport network (Gordon 2012). This provides
Transport for London with much more detailed demand information, which enables them to
improve service planning, market research, and other functions.
In addition to developing analytical methods to get more value out of automated data, other
research has built on the standard measurements to create more complex metrics that
capture multiple dimensions of service. Uniman (2010) uses Transport for London's AFC
data to create a reliability buffer time (RBT) metric. Uniman defines RBT as the "amount of
extra time that passengers must budget above the typical journey time in order to arrive on
time at their destination with a specified level of certainty." It is calculated as the 9 5 th
percentile minus the median running time for a segment or O-D pair. Schil (2012) looks at
excess RBT by comparing the RBT for a typical day to the RBT for the disrupted day. He
uses this to measure the severity of service disruptions.
Generally, the transition from data to information is conceptually straightforward, involving
computations that can be done by any spreadsheet, statistics, or database software. A
substantial number of methods for translating ADCS data into information have been
developed that effectively characterize many dimensions of public transport service. While
new information may not result in service changes, the use of ADCS is not limited by a lack
of understanding of how to translate data into information.
2.2.3 Information, Knowledge, and Wisdom
Though past work with transit ADCS has not been discussed within the DIKW framework,
many past studies have analyzed large datasets and then applied this information to answer
specific questions. In doing so, this research has generated new knowledge about transit
service based on more detailed information.
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Shireman (2011) uses MBTA AVL data to explore opportunities for more productive vehicle
scheduling. Shireman's analysis first generates more detailed information about bus running
times. It then explores how changing certain operating assumptions and constraints in the
MBTA's scheduling software could produce a more efficient schedule. Shireman codifies
this knowledge in his thesis, but his specific findings have not yet been applied by the MBTA
to modify its vehicle schedules. The MBTA has, however, begun to use the software and
approach from Shireman's work to reschedule its routes.
Other work has attempted to identify and resolve issues on the MiBTA's Green Line, a light
rail line with a downtown subway and four surface branches. Malikova (2012) uses vehicle
location records for the MBTA to assess the impact of introducing three-car trains on the
line. Her analysis produces information on running time and headway performance before
and after three-car trains began running. From this information, Malikova shows that current
implementation of three-car trains had increased headways and bunching in the downtown
subway. Based on this knowledge, she proposes alternate implementation schemes that
could avoid this issue.
Automated data from other agencies has also been analyzed and applied to improve service.
Frumin (2010) analyzes Transport for London's AFC records to characterize both passenger
behavior and service quality on the London Overground. This new information generates
knowledge of how uneven scheduling on the North and West London lines influences
passenger behavior and travel experience. London Overground has applied this knowledge
to create a new vehicle schedule that provides more regular service. Frumin uses the metrics
developed in his work to evaluate the change and concludes that the new schedule has a
positive impact on customers and service quality.
San Francisco's Municipal Transportation Agency (Muni) analyzes ADCS data to develop
knowledge about problems and propose changes that address poor performance. Analyzing
train turn times has led to a revised turning procedure that reduced turn times. Evaluating
bus schedule adherence and supervisor placement led to relocating some supervisors, which
has improved departure adherence (Pangilinan 2013).
28
In Montreal, Tetreault and El-Geneidy (2010) use AVL and AFC data for a route (67 Saint-
Michel) to evaluate proposals for new limited-stop services along the same corridor. Their
work quantifies the change in travel time for customers on both the limited-stop and existing
services and finds savings for both groups. They report their findings to Socit6 de
Transport de Montr6al (STM), the public transport operator sponsoring the work, who then
implemented the service. In an ex-post analysis, the researchers evaluate running times after
the implementation of the new route and determine that their estimates were acceptably
close to the implemented reality. In this case, two types of knowledge were generate from
analyzing travel time information: (1) the most effective stopping pattern for the new service,
and (2) the accuracy of the model. This validated the model for future use. This work also
implies that the operating agency trusted the researchers and their work, since they
implemented their suggestions. The work does not dcscribe how this trust was gained,
however.
All of this past work has focused on addressing specific issues, where an analyst interprets
the information and their knowledge is then codified and communicated in a report, along
with recommended actions. This represents a centralized knowledge generation paradigm.
This is in contrast to a distributed paradigm where information is presented and viewers
create their own knowledge. Under this paradigm, information design and visualization play
an important role in aiding viewers in interpreting the information.
Kennedy (2012) explores and evaluates different techniques for visualizing transportation
information for a variety of audiences. He concludes that dynamic information visualizations
that allow users to interact with the data and change what information is presented provide
the best opportunity for creating knowledge among diversified groups of stakeholders.
Many transit agencies have begun distributing real-time information to customers either via
the Internet, mobile apps, or signs at stops and stations. This is a distributed knowledge-
generation platform that enables customers to combine the real-time information with
information about other routes, traffic, and other factors. Based on their prior experience
this may allow a rider to know when to leave, how fast to walk, what route to take, or
whether to take a taxi. Over time passengers may develop wisdom such as what path to take
in certain situations. If customers had access to detailed, quantitative information about the
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MBTA that allowed them to see performance as it relates to their trip, this would provide
additional information beyond what they gather from their experiences. Such information is
not currently available publicly.
The Toyota Production Model, which is often lauded by business scholars, provides an
example of a distributed knowledge generation model that influences organizational
practices. The Toyota Model empowers those in most direct contact with the manufacturing
process to address problems at that level. All parts of the production process are specified to
a minute degree. If an employee is not meeting goals, she or he works with a supervisor to
discuss a remedy. In some cases, this involves changing the way the employee is approaching
the task. In others, it is changing the specification of the process (Spear and Bowen 1999).
The point is that Toyota's performance management incorporates a distributed, bottom-up
process to generate knowledge. Employees are taking in data about their adherence to
standards and generating information about their performance and the circumstances
influencing it. Knowledge about how to improve a failing process is generated from those
involved in it, rather than requiring an analyst to gather information and find a solution.
Both the centralized and distributed paradigms have had success in generating knowledge
and making changes in organizational practice. This research generally follows a centralized
model, with MIT researchers performing the data analysis and leading the development of
the performance reports and pilot projects. However, its intention is to create performance
information that enables a distributed knowledge generation platform, allowing the MBTA
to continue to make service improvements after the conclusion of this work. For this reason,
it solicited the input of MBTA operations personnel as to what information was meaningful
to them and would enable them to better manage service.
2.3 Innovation and Change in the Public Sector Context
Innovation generally aims to change the way things are done. In the DIKW framework, this
implies improving knowledge and wisdom because these underlie action. It may also involve
generating new information to create an improved understanding of the situation, which
allows for innovation. This section reviews literature on innovation in the public sector to
understand how information becomes knowledge in this context.
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In general, public sector organizations are characterized as bureaucracy. While bureaucracy
often has been associated with inefficiency and frustration, Max Weber argues that it
developed due to its technical advantages of mechanizing and routinizing the process of
administration, just as industrial processes had done to production. He notes that
bureaucracy's strict hierarchical form removes ambiguity and enables tasks to be completed
more quickly because they are fully prescribed by the superior to the subordinate. Weber
also argues that bureaucracy in its purest form eschews nepotism and uses a meritocratic
process for advancing within its hierarchy, providing an incentive to perform well.
Individuals functioning in a bureaucracy develop specialized knowledge of their tasks, and
thus perform them more efficiently over time. While bureaucracy is sometimes misconstrued
as a government phenomenon, Weber observes that it is fully aligned with the ideals of
capitalism: efficiency, specialization, and competition. It is the organizational structure of
most mature corporations and government agencies (Weber 1946).
Many of the characteristics of innovation may conflict with the highly structured and
methodical nature of bureaucracy. Innovation is often experimental. It may result in failure
as often as success. Robert Behn argues that this creates inherent dilemmas for those
attempting to make changes in government agencies. Innovation is not routine. In many
cases it involves changing procedure (Behn 1997). This may disrupt the mechanized
bureaucratic process. Alan Altshuler writes that the high degree of scrutiny placed on public
agencies makes managers risk-averse. They are inclined to prioritize avoiding incidents over
trying new things to optimize performance. Altshuler also notes that much innovation
originates from the lower ranks of an organization that are closer to service provision
(Altshuler and Zegans 1997). This may conflict with the hierarchical, top-down nature of
bureaucratic organizations.
In a case study of two government agencies, however, Peter Blau shows that employees in
government agencies do welcome changes to procedures. He finds this to be true
particularly when the changes address existing problems or make their jobs easier. His study
also finds that agencies will welcome change that increase their workload if they see it as
enabling the agency to better accomplish its core mission (Blau 1963).
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Altshuler and Zegans outline several broad strategies that they have found to be common in
successful cases of public sector innovation:
1. Proceeding incrementally;
2. Alleviating problems widely-recognized as urgent and explaining how the innovation
addresses the problem;
3. Being close to clients and relying on them to convey positive messages to political
authorities that support the innovation;
4. Casting a wide net in search of support and aligning existing institutional resources
with the work;
5. Building and sustaining a coalition that supports the innovation and has the power to
authorize and implement it;
6. Being open to feedback, which allows continuous learning and adaptation;
7. Being tenacious, dedicated, and optimistic in order to overcome major setbacks
(Altshuler and Zegans 1997, 78).
Altshuler and Zegans' observations also suggest that new information is more likely to
produce innovative knowledge if it makes a clear case for change and addresses existing
problems. This provides an argument for producing information in close collaboration with
its eventual end users in order to gain a better understanding of what information would
help improve current practice. Because individuals in government agencies can be protective
of their domains, working closely with them may help produce a sense of ownership and
break down territorial barriers to innovation and embracing new information.
These characteristics of bureaucracy provide an important framework for researching how
information can be disseminated within a government institution to produce knowledge and
wisdom. Because bureaucracies are hierarchical and employees have specialized knowledge
of their tasks, the same information presented to different people will likely result in
different knowledge, and potentially different applications. This suggests that a critical aspect
of innovation and performance management in bureaucracy is identifying employees whose
knowledge impacts performance. If the intent is to change a process, those with the power
to affect that process must obtain new knowledge about it. The ideal candidates will be those
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whose actions impact what is being measured. Because their actions are represented by the
information, this establishes a feedback loop between action and performance quality.
2.4 Purpose and Need for this Research
The existing literature on translating data into information has successfully developed
methods of applying ADCS data to measure transit service. It is not a lack of good
information that is restricting the application of knowledge to improve transit services.
While previous work has created new knowledge from ADCS-based information, there has
been little research as to how information is used within an organization, what effect that it
has, and what influences its effectiveness.
Past work has also been successful in translating information into knowledge under a
centralized paradigm where analysts take data, developing knowledge, and communicating
this knowledge in a report or memorandum to the agency. There has been little research into
the effectiveness of this strategy. There is also a lack of research into the effectiveness of the
current performance reporting regime, which follows a distributed knowledge generation
paradigm. Performance reports are made available to managers, who develop their own
knowledge about managing the system and strategies to address issues.
This work seeks to begin fifing in the gap in literature between how to measure service and
how to make changes in a public organization. To this end, it focuses on how the
measurements chosen, the design of the reports, and the process of creating them influence
the impact information has on service delivery.
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The MBTA Context and Its Use
of Automated Data
The MBTA is one of the largest and oldest transit systems in the country. It has installed
ADCS on many of its modes and is currently using the information for real-time service
control and some performance reporting. This chapter describes the MBTA context in more
detail. It discusses its current automated systems and how the data is used. It also evaluates
the influence of these data applications on service delivery.
3.1 The MBTA
The MBTA is the fifth-largest transit system in the U.S. by total ridership, serving 356
million unlinked passenger trips in 2012 (APTA 2012). It operates all major modes of transit,
including three rapid transit lines (Red, Orange, and Blue Lines), two light rail lines (Green
Line and Mattapan Trolley), two BRT lines (Silver Line Waterfront and Washington Street),
200 bus & trolleybus routes, 12 Commuter Rail lines, and four ferries.
According to the MBTA's most recent service statistics from 2010, the Red Line has the
highest average weekday boardings with over 190,000, followed by the Green Line with over
180,000 (MBTA 2010). Table 2 displays average weekday boardings for most MBTA modes
(excluding commuter rail and ferry).
Service Boardings
Red 192,513
Green 181,434
Orange 141,052
Blue 44,233
Silver 29,649
Mattapan 4,586
Bus 357,482
Total 950,949
Table 2: MBTA boardings by Service
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Figure 3: MBTA System Diagram showing Rapid Transit and Key Bus Routes
The MBTA is headed by a General Manager (GM), who directs the overall policy and
strategy of the organization. The Massachusetts Secretary of Transportation sits on the
MBTA board and also influences policy. The Chief Operation Officer (COO) is primarily
responsible for the day-to-day operation of the system. The Operations Control Center
(OCC) is in charge of many departments that currently produce and use data from the
MBTA's automated systems. Dispatchers see train and bus positions from the ATO and
AVL systems in real-time. Plans and Schedules uses running time data to plan service.
Operations Technology maintains these systems. See Figure 4 for an organizational chart of
MBTA staff and departments relevant to this work. Additionally, during the course of this
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Figure 4: Organization Chart of Relevant MBTA Employees
research the MBTA had a Director of Innovation who reported directly to the GM. He was
primarily responsible for creating visible changes that improved the customer experience,
particularly through the application of new technologies. His projects were thus reliant upon
ADCS data. They included releasing a real-time bus and train arrival feed for mobile
applications, displaying real-time arrivals in rail stations, and introducing mobile ticketing on
the Commuter Rail.
The MBTA currently has the following ADCS for rail rapid transit, light rail, BRT, and bus.
e Automated Fare Collection (AFC): transaction records for magnetic stripe
CharlieTickets and RFID CharlieCards, including time of transaction, rapid transit
station or bus route, and fare type, among other pieces of data.
e Automated Vehicle Location (AVL): records of bus position based on GPS and bus
odometers, including time of arrivals and departures from key points along the route.
- Automatic Train Operation (ATO): records of heavy rail train positions based on
the track circuit from which the train is currently drawing power. Records include
time, train direction, destination, and other information.
- Automated Vehicle Identification (AVI): records of light rail (Green Line only)
vehicles passing key points along their routes, usually junctions. Records include
time, train route, and direction.
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While the MBTA's heavy rail, light rail4, and buses all currently generate data on both vehicle
locations and passengers, there are important differences between the modes. For heavy,
ATO gives precise train locations and AFC gives precise passenger boarding stations.
However, because the fare gate is separate from the train, the time a person enters the
station is not the time they board the train. For light rail (Green Line), AVI provides
imprecise train locations because AVI points are several stations apart. On the surface
branches of the Green Line, there may be as little as one AVI point for the entire surface
segment, so location is effectively unknown until the train reaches the end of the route.
Because the Green Line runs partly in a subway with gated stations and partly on the surface
with open stations, AFC provides two kinds of data. In the subway, the data is similar to
heavy rail: precise location but imprecise time. On the surface passengers pay on the vehicle,
so the AFC transaction records the precise time they board but only contains the line, not
the stop. This is similar to the passenger information available for buses. The AVL system,
however, provides precise bus positions. The Silver Line bus rapid transit has the same
characteristics as other buses for its vehicle information, but the passenger information
characteristics of the Green Line. Table 3 summarizes these differences in the characteristics
of ADCS across modes. Transfers between services where passengers board on the vehicle
record the subsequent boarding. Transfers within interchange stations are not recorded, but
can be inferred, as shown in Barry et al. (2002).
Mode Vehicle Position Passenger Entrance Passenger Entrance
and Time Location Time
Heavy Rail (Red, Blue Precise Precise Approximate
Orange)
Light Rail (Green) Imprecise Precise (subway) Approximate (subway)
Line only (surface) Precise (surface)
Light Rail (Mattapan) None Line only Precise
BRT (Silver) Precise Precise (subway) Approximate (subway)
Line only (surface) Precise (surface)
Bus Precise Line only Precise
Table 3: ADCS Characteristics for Different Modes of the MBTA
4 With the exception of the Mattapan High Speed Line, which does not currently have vehicle location data
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3.2 The MBTA's Use of Automated Data
In the past decade the MBTA has begun utilizing the data collected from ADCS. The
current applications of automated data can be categorized along two dimensions: scope
(internal versus external) and timeframe (real-time versus historical). This implies four broad
categories of applications, which are depicted in Figure 5 along with the MBTA's current
data uses.
The upper-left quadrant, internal real-time uses, is why many agencies install ADCS. They
include displaying vehicle locations, estimating vehicle arrivals at terminals and if they will
make their next trips, and displaying schedule or headway adherence. Such information
enables more precise operations control because dispatchers have more accurate and detailed
information. The lower-left quadrant, external real-time uses, has followed internal real-time
uses at the MIBTA. ADCS may not have been designed for customer information, but once
the data exists it can be disseminated to inform riders about current service. The same data
that underlies real-time information for dispatchers can be adapted to estimate bus and train
Internal
Vehicle Locations
Estimated Arrivals
Schedule Adherence (bus)
Real-time
Bus Arrivals
Countdown Signs
U
On-time Performance
Running Times for Scheduling
Historical
Performance Reports
Blue Book
External
Figure 5: Categorization of ADCS Uses at the MBTA
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arrivals, which the MBTA releases to customers via the Internet, mobile apps, and station
signs.
Real-time ADCS applications represent new data applications that were driven by ADCS,
since there was previously no real-time information. Once the data is logged by the ADCS,
this also enables applications of historical data. These have mostly been replacing manually
collected data in existing functions. Internally (upper right quadrant), this includes calculating
OTP and running times based on automatic vehicle location rather than manual checks.
Externally (lower right quadrant), these statistics are summarized for various periods of time
and published in monthly and annual performance reports.
This chapter discusses what information the TMBTA currently extracts from its automated
data as well as the limitations of its current practices. These findigs form the basis of the
work discussed in the following chapters to create more valuable information from the
agency's data.
3.3 Internal Real-time Applications for Operations
At the MBTA, both heavy rail and bus have real-time information for dispatching, though
they differ in the information they display. Both the ATO and AVL systems provide real-
time vehicle location data to dispatchers, allowing them to see where vehicles are. The bus
Computer Aided Dispatching (CAD) system combines this with schedule and other bus
location data to give dispatchers information about schedule adherence and headways
(Figure 6). The technology suite is generally referred to CAD-AVL. The ATO system gives
heavy rail dispatchers train position in a graphic display (Figure 7), from which they can
interpret headways and speed, but it does not relate this information directly. The system
also provides estimated arrivals at the terminals along with the next schedule departure so
dispatchers can see if a train will be late. These visual displays allow both bus and rail
dispatchers to respond to delays or disruptions in near real-time, adjust vehicle and crew
schedules accordingly, and generally better manage daily operations.
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Figure 6: Real-time display of AVL information for bus routes 1 and 1 5.
Routes are abstracted to a single line for each direction, with timepoint stops marked. The line
connecting the pentagonal bus icons to the route indicates where the bus should be based on
its schedule. In this example, blue buses are early and green are within the on-time range.
Figure 7: Real-time display of ATO information for the Red Line.
The two parallel lines represent the tracks, and a red section indicates that a train is currently
on that section of track.
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The ATO system includes Automated Train Dispatching (ATD), which rings a bell at
terminal stations at scheduled departure times, prompting drivers to depart. This effectively
automates everything but the driving of the Red, Blue, and Orange lines, so dispatchers' use
of real-time location data focuses on maintaining good service. This includes ensuring that
operators actually leave when the bell rings, adjusting scheduled departures when trains are
going to miss their next trip, reassigning vehicles and drivers in the case of disabled trains,
and holding trains at intermediate stations to adjust headways or for other reasons. While
there is no departure bell for buses, all vehicles are equipped with screens that are linked to
the CAD-AVL system. These screens display their next departure time so that drivers know
when to leave, as well as their schedule adherence en route. Bus dispatch uses real-time
information in much the same way as their rail counterparts: adjusting departures,
reassigning vehicles and drivers to avoid missing trips, and expressing or holding buses to
break up bunches.
Both the ATO and CAD-AVL systems have their shortcomings. In both cases, there is no
immediate feedback about the effects of dispatching action (such as a running calculation of
OTP or another metric) other than the visual representation of vehicle locations on the
dispatchers' monitors. Additionally, the rail ATO system does not display headways or
arrival predictions for stations other than the terminal, which is problematic because
headways are fundamental to service quality. On the rail side, there are no indicators or
alarms that alert dispatchers to problems; dispatchers must observe them. For buses, the
marker on the map changes colors if the bus is early or late. Early and late can be calculated
either based on the schedule or on the headway to the previous and next buses, whichever
dispatchers select.
3.4 Internal Historical Applications
The ATO and AVL systems have historical reporting tools that produce on-time
performance reports for any desired period, based on either terminal departure and arrival
times or headway adherence. The AVL system has a more sophisticated reporting tool,
Smart Bus Mart, which allows a user to view performance information in different ways. The
most commonly used report is the OTP report for the MBTA's 15 most heavily used routes
(dubbed Key Routes - see Figure 9). Operations staff can access several other pre-made
reports, including on-time performance for any given period, schedule adherence down to
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the individual trip, and headway adherence. If they desire additional infornation, they can
specify additional reports through a Web interface (Figure 8). The metric of interest, level of
aggregation, time period, route(s) are customizable. Performance can be aggregated by driver,
garage, route, and other elements.
Current OTP is based on the MBTA's service standards. These standards are developed and
revised through a public process that takes customer input into account (MBTA 2010). The
current service standard for rail transit is a train departing the terminal within 150% of the
scheduled headway. The standard for bus is two-pronged, differentiated based on the
frequency of service. Walk-up service - where customers are assumed to show up to a stop
or station without looking at a schedule - is defined as service with a frequency of ten
minutes or less. Scheduled service is anything with a headway greater than ten minutes. The
on-time standard for walk-up service is a vehicle arriving on that route within 150% of the
scheduled headway. For scheduled service, on-time is defined as departing a timepoint
between one minute early and five minutes late. Bus OTP is measured at multiple points
along the route: the origin, several midpoints, and the destination. Overall OTP is calculated
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as a percentage: total timepoints the bus or route served on-time divided by its total number
of timepoints. Schedules for some routes employ different standards throughout the day.
The #1 bus, for example, is scheduled to arrive at 7-8 minute intervals in the peaks, so it
would be evaluated on the headway standard for those periods. In the midday, it is scheduled
at 13-minute intervals, so it is evaluated on the schedule standard. Table 4 summarizes these
standards.
Service On-Time Standard Measurement Point
Rail Headway s 1.5 times scheduled Departure point (1 per trip)
Walk-up Bus Headway 1.5 times scheduled Key timepoints (5-10 per trip)
Scheduled Bus 1 minute early to 5 minutes late Key timepoints (5-10 per trip)
Table 4: Summary of MBTA Service Standards
In addition to performing its own analyses, the MBTA also provides data to local universities
for their research. Usually such research involves analyzing the data beyond what is possible
in the reporting system, and the findings are presented to the MBTA in a memo or report,
along with recommendations. These reports generate additional information for the MBTA,
and the researchers attempt to transfer the knowledge they gain by providing
recommendations. In some cases, like Malikova's (2012) suggestions to adjust the headways
of three-car trains on the Green Line, this knowledge is applied to improve service. In other
cases, it remains unused.
The MBTA has also begun analyzing running times from the AVL system using Hastus ATP
(a module of their scheduling software, Hastus). Service planning has begun rescheduling
routes based on the results. ATP is an analysis tool that uses AVL data as an input (GIRO
2011). It analyzes variations in the running times within each period of the day, as specified
by the user. Its output is a running time for each route in each period that will allow buses to
make their next trip a desired percentage of the time. This percentage must be defined by the
user. If it is set too high, the software will require more buses to run the service; too low and
service will run late. ATP provides a more accurate input that Hastus uses to allocate buses
to a route, which it then feeds into vehicle and crew schedules. More accurate running times
means that Hastus allocates a number of buses that should enable a route to run on time the
desired percent of the time. Underestimating running times means a bus may not make its
next trip, while overestimation results in less service than is possible.
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This represents a shift in the internal use of ADCS beyond generating information for
information's sake. OTP is simply information, and there is not currently a systematic
process for applying that information to improve service. Poor performance is
acknowledged and dispatchers are sometimes questioned as to why service was poor, but
there is no institutional process of determining how to address recurring issues. Analyzing
running times with the goal of improving bus scheduling is the creation of information
(running times) with the intention of generating knowledge (how to change the schedule).
With the recent exception of Hastus ATP, the MBTA's regular use of historical data has
been limited to OTP reports: a single percentage for each route every day. These are
individual reports on one dimension of service quality, and different views of OTP such as
by route or by timepoint are separated. This limits the amount of knowledge a viewer can
obtain. The burden is on the viewer to relate different performance information and identifyT
causes and trends. Showing only one dimension of service at a time, such as OTP or
dropped trips, does not provide a comprehensive view of service. Without relating different
dimensions of service quality, it is difficult to understand what is causing variations in OTP
(management, equipment, passengers, weather, etc.).
Though the MBTA's internal reporting systems are flexible enough to allow staff to gather
information on other dimensions of service, they must be willing to take the time to
aggregate and analyze the information. Multiple reports can provide information like average
speeds, headways, incidents, labor shortages, and other factors that influence of OTP, but
seeking out these reports is not part of the daily routine for operators and managers.
The Key Routes On-Time Performance report for buses, shown in Figure 9, is emailed to
dispatchers and OCC managers every morning, The report provides summary information
about overall OTP on each route and how they compare. However, it provides no detail as
to which buses were early or late, how off schedule they were, whether they were judged
based on the headway or schedule standard, or how many passengers were affected. Thus
there is little knowledge that a viewer can develop from this report. There is nothing to help
explain why and how this performance occurred.
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The aggregate on-time performance number for a route does not allow operations personnel
to know what is the result of factors beyond their control like traffic, and what is due to
management. This information requires further investigation using the Smart Bus Mart
reporting system, which is time consuming and may still require further analytical work to
capture multiple dimensions of performance. Shared segments where passengers can take
multiple routes are not judged based on a joint headway across routes, but on the headways
or schedule adherence of each route individually. This is particularly problematic when the
individual routes are not frequent enough to be judged by the headway standard, but the
frequency of the combined service is. This is the case for the #116 and #117, which operate
at 20-30-minute frequencies for much of the day. They serve the same termini and share
much of their route, so most customers can take either service. Dispatchers can manage
service to maintain a combined headway between the two routes, but this may result in many
off-schedule departures and low OTP. From a customer perspective, such poorly rated
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Figure 9: Key Routes Daily On-Time Performance Report
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service is good service.
Additional information is available from other reports that must currently be sought out. A
line report (available in Appendix A, page 121) provides detail on:
* The breakdown of not-on-time trips by reason (early, late, headway)
* OTP by hour and direction
* OTP at each point along the route
* OTP for each run.
While this report provides details that address many of the shortcomings of the single OTP
number, it is four pages long for each route. Additionally, it still examines each dimension
separately. OTP by time is separate from OTP by location, so the viewer can understand
that there are problems during specific hours (2:00 PM) or at specific places (Hynes Station),
but not a specific place and time (such as Central Square at 5:00 PM). This limits the amount
of knowledge that can be gleaned from the information.
Rail OTP reporting is similar, though more tabular and less visual, as shown in Figure 10.
The report summarizes OTP by period and direction (the Red Line has two branches, for a
total of four directions). As described earlier, OTP for rail is judged solely on the headway
departing the terminal. The 93% overall OTP for the Red Line on this day means that 93%
of trips left the terminal within 150% of their scheduled headway. This report only measures
service on the two branches individually. There is no measure of combined service on the
trunk portion, though 67% of trips are only on the trunk.' This means that the scheduled
headway that is the basis of on-time is the headway between two trains of the same branch.
Branch headways are 9 minutes in the peaks, so trains are on-time if they leave within 13.5
minutes of the prior trip on that branch. Two northbound trains that reach the merge point
at JFK/UMass 10 minutes apart are on-time, even though this separation is more than
double the expected joint headway of 4.5 minutes. Short headways (bunches) still count as
on-time.
5 Based on the O-D calculations described in Section 4.1.3
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Moreover, this report is the first of 13 pages that present OTP for each trip run that day.
This is a great deal of information that results in little knowledge. Unlike the bus report,
which contains intermediate detail about performance over the course of the day or route,
the rail report contains only highly aggregate and highly disaggregate information. This limits
the ability to gain knowledge of trends and patterns. Moreover, there is no context for the
OTP numbers other than time and direction, which inhibits the viewer from understanding
potential problem areas. Furthermore, the laxness of the standard means that all three rail
lines are usually above 90% on-time, even when service may be perceived as lacking.
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Figure 10: Front Page of the Daily On-Time Performance Report for Rail
The current institutional applications that transform data from ADCS into information are
limited in the amount of knowledge they generate. This is a result both of what information
is produced (e.g. rail OTP does not reflect service quality) and how it is presented (e.g. bus
OTP is not aggregated in ways that can inform management decisions). While the work of
Shireman (2011) and Malikova (2012) has successfully generated knowledge from ADCS
data, and in the case of Malikova, even led to a change in Green Line headways, this
knowledge generation has been based on a single dedicated analyst addressing a specific
problem. Their work is not based on the MBTA's standard reports and took weeks or
months of analysis. A public agency with limited resources and overburdened staff needs its
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performance reports to be able to generate similarly useful knowledge that it can apply every
day. Broadening the audience to include the public creates an additional set of stakeholders
to assess service and suggest improvements.
3.5 External Historical Applications
The MBTA has also developed public-facing information from ADCS data that riders can
incorporate into their own understanding of the system. The MBTA currently publishes
performance reports on a monthly basis (Figure 11), disaggregated to the individual subway
lines, which are complemented by an annual report on service statistics.
The information in the monthly scorecard is aggregated to the line level. The detail pages for
each line show the historical performance of each metric over the past 12 months. This is
enough information to understand general month-to-month trends and to draw correlations
among them. For example, seeing a drop in vehicle maintenance and system maintenance
along with poor OTP suggests that maintenance levels influence performance. However, the
t ScoreCard
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historical information is static and non-interactive, limiting the public's ability to view service
performance as it relates to their use of the system. The understanding that can emerge from
this information is limited to "Is the T performing better or worse than usual?" and "How
does my line compare to the rest of the system?" This falls short of knowledge, however,
because the understanding of how and why performance is changing is speculative. The
interpretation of this information could be that the MBTA is poorly managed, or that it has
insufficient resources, that it needs new equipment, among others. This ambiguity reduces
the value of this information to both the MBTA and to the public.
The annual report (known as the Bluebook) provides extensive amounts of information on
maintenance, ridership, equipment availability, and other characteristics. The information is
aggregated along multiple dimensions, among them month, route, and service area. There is
a wealth of information to sift through, which can be used by politicians, reporters, advocacy
groups, researchers, or riders to understand the state of service at the MBTA. However, it is
only produced once per year' and is in a relatively inaccessible format (a 100 page document).
Generating knowledge from information in the Bluebook thus requires searching through it
and relating pieces of information to one another. The knowledge is thus limited to people
who are willing to devote time to this research and by how they communicate their findings.
3.6 External Real-time Applications
The M\fBTA also makes real-time bus and train information available through an open data
feed, from which developers have created Internet and smartphone applications providing
customers with train and bus arrival times (Figure 12). In 2012, the MBTA also introduced
rn-station train arrival predictions at most of its heavy rail stations, providing all customers
with an estimate of their wait without mobile Internet access (Figure 13). Silver Line BRT
stops on Washington Street and at Logan Airport also feature arrival predictions.
6 Or iS supposed to be, though the latest version is from 2010
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Figure 12: Mobile apps based on the MBTA's NextBus Information and developer feed.
Left: NextBus mobile interface showing the #1 bus. Right: OpenMBTA showing the Orange Line.
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Figure 13: Real-time train and bus arrival displays
Left: a countdown sign on the Red Line. Right: arrival sign for the Washington St. Silver Line.
This has been a successful application of ADCS because it gives the users (customers) the
information that they need in order to make a decision. Providing real-time information
allows customers to know how long their wait will be and may inform their decision about
route or mode choice. A customer can see how many minutes remain until the train or bus
arnves, and can choose to take a taxi or walk or bike if it is too long. The real-time
information creates an immediate basis for a decision such as "I need to take a cab to make
it to the airport on time," or "The 1 bus isn't coming soon so I should take the Red Line."
Additionally, seeing the countdown signs every trip establishes knowledge of normal
headways on the line, which may ultimately change riders' expectations. This in turn may
also create external pressure on management as riders begin to get a quantitative view of
service.
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The countdown signs and real-time bus arrival apps provide users with a snapshot of service
that is relevant to them. While over time they accumulate multiple snapshots, which
represent multiple pieces of information, they still do not have a full picture of the system.
This means they can see problems with individual trips - a long headway, a slow trip - but
do not have information on what is going on in the rest of the system that may be causing
these problems. The links between performance on different lines are not always evident.
For example, when a rail line has a failure that requires the MBTA to provide shuttles, it
pulls the buses from the most frequent routes because these can absorb the loss with less of
an impact on headways. Customers, however, do not have this piece of information and thus
may never relate a breakdown on the Orange Line with a long wait for the #28 bus.
3.7 Effectiveness of Current Data Usage at the MBTA
Real-time information derived from ADCS provides both dispatchers and passengers with a
depiction of current performance that allows them to evaluate the need for and effect of
action. It enables dispatchers to see in real-time how unscheduled variations in service
impact the system, as well as the effects of actions they take to adjust for these. In theory,
this should accumulate over time to form wisdom that allows them to predict the effect of a
problem and take action to mitigate it. Similarly, passengers with access to real-time
information can make more informed decisions about mode and route choice.
The agency's public information, however, is not comprehensive enough to generate
knowledge about causes of problems. The public can either get (1) a granular snapshot of
current system performance from the real-time arrival information or (2) an aggregate
summary of performance by line over the course of a month or year.
These two extremes do not allow external users like advocacy groups, the press, and elected
officials to analyze performance in detail to identify trends, problems, and potential solutions.
The historical information is also static and non-interactive, limiting the public's ability to
view service performance as it relates to their use of the system. It is thus difficult for the
public to provide anything other than anecdotal evidence for complaints about service
quality. It is possible to archive the real-time data feed and use this for analysis, which was
undertaken by a group of MIT researchers in 2011 and 2012 (Gerstle 2012). Their research
successfully analyzes the data to produce useful information about running times, but they
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note that the data was imprecise due to the relatively infrequent nature of the feed (only
refreshed every 60 seconds).
The limitations of the current performance information restrict the amount of knowledge
that can be generated. Internally, the amount of work required to relate different pieces of
information and generate useful knowledge is time-prohibitive, thus information is rarely
translated into knowledge or action. The existing performance reports do not provide
enough detail to show the impacts of dispatchers' reactions to real-time information. On the
rail system, headway adjustments mid-route to avoid bunching are not reflected in the
current OTP numbers because they only measure terminal departures. The same action
would be reflected in the OTP statistic for buses, but the aggregated reporting format makes
it difficult to draw direct connections between actions and OTP. Additionally, the current
OTP numbers are route-specific, which does not capture joint service for a corridor where
customers can take multiple services. The Red Line is the primary example of this, where
current OTP evaluates Ashmont and Braintree trains independently. This also occurs on
several bus routes such as the #116 and #117, #71 and #73, and #70 and #70A. Not
measuring a joint headway (time between vehicles regardless of route) means that actions to
even out service between routes do not factor into OTP. Table 5 in Chapter 4 explains this
limitation in more detail.
The MBTA's reporting system could be improved by modifying the historical performance
information to eliminate some of the barriers to its use. Namely:
1. Changing the way service is measured to reflect how customers experience service;
2. Eliminating the need to search for detailed information;
3. Showing and relating multiple dimensions of service.
The following chapter will discuss the approach this research took to incorporating these
changes into a new performance report, and how the process influenced the effectiveness of
the performance information. Chapter 6 will propose how this information can be made
accessible to other parts of the organization and to the public in the future.
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4 Enhancing the Utility ofPerformance Information
Having assessed limitations in the MBTA's current use of its historical data, both for internal
and external audiences, this research attempts to address the issues that limit its usefulness,
particularly for operations personnel. In doing so, it rethinks both the metrics themselves,
their presentation, and the process used to create them. This chapter describes the process
of developing new performance reports for the MBTA's heavy rail system, as well as the
resulting changes to the metrics and reports themselves. It concludes that to be useful,
performance information must be both easily comprehensible and trusted by service
managers. Reorienting metrics around customers and using graphical techniques to display
information may improve comprehensibility. The effect of new communications techniques
can be tested via a collaborative process, which also helps to build trust in the reports and a
willingness to distribute them beyond the operations team.
4.1 Approach and Objectives
The work was originally conceived to provide more frequent and detailed information to
customers about service quality that complements the performance "snapshots" produced
by the countdown signs. It started with reconceptualizing metrics, and engaged the MBTA's
OCC early in the process. The rationale behind this was that if a quantitative assessment of
their work is to be made public, service controllers should first be given input into the
measurements. Moreover, they should be given the chance to see and address issues that
become evident with new measurement techniques. The initial discussions with the OCC
revealed that they were also interested in revised performance metrics, which shifted the
focus of this research to creating performance reports that contribute to dispatchers'
knowledge specifically. Though the intention of releasing information more broadly within
the MBTA and publicly has been retained, this objective was not achieved in the course of
this research.
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4.1.1 Approach
While not initially planned, engaging the OCC initiated a collaborative and iterative process
to incorporate feedback from operations personnel on what types of metrics would impact
the way they managed service. This process has been critical to the project's acceptance by
the OCC and its ability to propose and implement service changes (described in Chapter 5).
It included multiple visits to the OCC to meet with dispatchers and managers and observe
their work. Operations staff have domain knowledge of operational problems and the merits
of different performance metrics. This has been combined with MIT's technical expertise in
manipulating data and ability to review existing practice and literature to produce new
performance reports.
A central tenet of this approach is that performance management is not a technical problem
to be solved analytically, but a managerial problem to be addressed socially. This applies
more to transit systems whose trains are driven and dispatched by humans than to
automated rail systems, where the only humans interacting with operations are passengers
(most of the time).
4.1.2 Objectives
Based on the concerns listed in Chapter 3 about the existing metrics, this research has
identified multiple objectives for revised performance reports. These include being:
1. Reflective of the customer experience, capturing the operating characteristics of
transit service that are salient to riders such as speed, frequency, and reliability;
2. Sensitive to variations in service that passengers are likely to perceive, like a long
headway or a dropped trip;
3. Limited to one page (either physical or virtual) so that information is less likely to be
overlooked or ignored.
4. Easily understood by operations control staff, managers, other MBTA personnel,
and passengers alike;
5. Detailed enough for operations staff to identify problems underlying poor
performance and take corrective action;
6. Based on existing automatically collected data so that calculation can be automated
and done in real-time or for the past day;
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This work hypothesizes that these qualities enable performance information to impact
service. This chapter discusses multiple iterations of new performance reports for the MBTA
and the rationale behind their evolution as they strove to meet these objectives. The
reactions and feedback from OCC managers and staff were the primary means of
determining how well the objectives four and five were being met. Their feedback provides
important lessons on how one of the intended audiences for the reports understands them.
The performance information and reports that result from this research are for a single
agency, based on the data and needs of the MBTA. Other agencies may face different
problems with their existing information and service or have management structures that
necessitate different solutions. The physical outputs of this research thus may not be
applicable to other agencies or even other lines within the MBTA, though the process and
principles may still be informative.
4.1.3 Technical methods
One of the initial drivers of this work was the introduction of real-time arrival signs on the
subway. This research uses the same data that underlies the prediction software. These are
records from the ATO system of a train occupying a specific circuit. The data are archived in
a Microsoft SQL Server database, where additional tables are created to calculate headways,
running times, and other statistics from them. Passenger information comes from archived
AFC transactions, which are stored in a separate SQL database. Because the system records
entries only, a process similar to that of Barry, et al. (2002) is used to infer destinations for
these transactions. This is part of ongoing MIT research for the MBTA. This results in an
origin-destination (O-D) matrix for the rail system for each day of data. An average daily
passenger volume is then calculated for each O-D pair. The passenger O-D data used in
developing these reports is an average for days in April 2012. In much of this work, the total
number of passengers for each O-D is converted into a rate (passengers per second) for each
period. This assumes constant arrivals over the period, which is consistent with the theory of
random arrivals used in most transit planning (Wilson and Attanucci 2011).
4.2 Initial Performance Report
The ultimate goal of performance measurement is to enable performance improvement. This
requires that managers are able to interpret the information and relate it to their knowledge
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about service. Choosing what information to produce from ACDS data began with
hypothesizing what knowledge about service would be most useful and applicable to MBTA
operations personnel and to riders. Discussions with OCC staff revealed complaints that the
rail reports were meaningless because they were always above 90% on-time, even after
significant disruptions. They also criticized the existing reports for not considering joint
service, both on the Red Line and on the #116 and #117 bus routes that share a majority of
their stops. These concerns suggested that operations staff desired information that more
accurately represented service as passengers see it. Knowing that the reports judged these
services separately but most customers used them interchangeably invalidated the
performance information in their view.
Conversations also revealed that OCC staff did not seek out performance information, but
did respond to the Key Bus Routes report that was emailed to them every day. A frequent
critique of this report, however, was that it gave no context as to what was driving the OTP
numbers. This suggests that OCC staff desired information about specific problems with
service that they could influence without having to search for it.
Two elements of the customer experience on public transit can be easily measured by AVL
and AFC: waiting time and in-vehicle travel time. Other aspects of the customer experience
such as crowding, comfort, and convenience are also important, but less readily measured
with these two data sources. To measure travel and wait time, this work began with two
basic units of analysis representing these parts of the experience:
1. Headway as a measure of wait time, as expected passenger wait time is half of the
headway (Wilson and Attanucci 2011)
2. Station-to-station travel time
The intent of these reports is to measure instances of poor service to provide a customer
perspective, instead of the system-oriented OTP. This stems from the assumption that
customers expect a certain level of performance, so poor service receives more attention
than good service. Put differently, passengers do not give the MBTA credit when it is
running well to the same extent that they blame it when service is poor.
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Based on this, we have chosen to measure the big gaps for rail services but have excluded
counting bunches. The rationale is that for rail services, short headways are not a concern
except when they create big gaps behind them; consistently short headways are simply good
service. The definition used for big gaps is based on the MBTA's existing headway metric,
1.5 times the scheduled headway, but this is limited to three minutes beyond the scheduled
headway in order to account for long headways that occur during off-peak hours. Under the
current standards, for example, with a 13 minute scheduled headway, 19.5 minutes is still
considered acceptable. From a passenger perspective 13 minutes is already a long headway,
so even a few minutes longer is poor service. With a three-minute cap, any headway over 16
minutes is unacceptable for a 13-minute frequency. Additionally, on the Red Line, which has
two branches, the current OTP metric measures trains on each branch individually but does
not measure the combined service on the shared portion, even though 67% of weekday
travel is only on the shared portion.7 The result is that during the peak periods, where branch
headways are scheduled at nine minutes, as long as a train leaves a terminal every 13.5
minutes or less service is on-time, even if service is bunched. Under the proposed metrics,
big gaps are counted separately for trunk and branch services. In the example shown in
Table 5 (below), where the headways should be 4.5 minutes on the trunk and 9 minutes on
the branches (peak hour service levels for the Red Line), the threshold for big gaps is 6.75
and 12 minutes, respectively.
Trunk Proposed Criteria Existing
(branch) Trunk Branch OTP
Time Branch Headway Service Service Criteria
8:26 Braintree Good Good On-time
8:30 Ashmont 4 Good Good On-time
8:37 Braintree 7(11) Big Gap Good On-time
8:43 Ashmont 6(13) Good Big Gap On-time
8:50 Braintree 7 (13) Big Gap Big Gap On-time
Table 5: Example of Red Line Headway Performance under Proposed and Existing Criteria
The headway metric is able to be calculated at any station or intermediate point. An analysis
of headway variations along the line shows that headways generally remain consistent from
terminal to terminal. The median difference in headway for a train's start and mid points is
zero or near zero, and 80% of trains' headways vary less than two minutes between different
7 Based on the O-D calculations described in Section 4.1.3
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points along a route. Measuring headways at one point in the system can thus provide an
accurate depiction of service along the entire line. This provides justification for measuring
headways at the terminals (the current practice), though it provides equal justification for
measuring at a midpoint. Managers know that there are more passengers at midpoint stations,
therefore measurements at these points are likely to be more salient.
4.2.1 Presentation
As seen in Figure 14, the first draft of the performance report revolves around the absolute
number of big gaps. This is similar to the OTP metric as it measures only one thing (in fact,
the opposite of OTP), but in more detail. In addition to the top-level total big gaps, the
report counts big gaps for service on each of the Red Line's branches. These break down
further into subtotals for each period and direction, for both trunk and branch service. The
totals and subtotals are color-coded red, orange, and green to- good, mediocre, and poor
service.' The chart in the upper right showing total big gaps over the past five days is meant
to give an indication of relative performance and an incentive to perform better than
previous days. Finally, graphs representing all headways over the day provide a disaggregate
view of service, with big gaps marked by red triangles. This is included because initial
analyses showed headway varying from one train to the next. Plotting the headway values
over the course of the day on a line chart emphasizes the change in headway from one train to
the next. Customers in theory would prefer as little variability in headways as possible, since
this makes their wait time more predictable. These graphs highlight headway variations in
addition to big gaps, as both negatively impact the customer experience.
While this report centers around big gaps, it also includes a count of long dwell times at each
station. This metric attempts to capture two things: (1) slow trips due to overcrowding,
which increases dwell times because more passengers enter and leave the train, and (2)
dispatchers holding for headway adjustments, which substitutes one passenger
inconvenience for another. This metric focuses on a different aspect of the customer
experience that is not captured in headways or OTP.
8 The thresholds for these color codes were arbitrary at the time this report was produced, since it was a proof-
of-concept. The idea was later abandoned, so no formal methodology was developed.
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4.2.2 Reaction and Input of Operations Personnel
This draft of the report was presented to the director of the OCC, who was surprised by the
headway graphs. They clearly show irregularity in service, particularly northbound where the
two branches merge. He also noted that measuring only big gaps may be inadequate, as
dispatchers could hold or express trains to maintain headway, but these also negatively
impact the customer experience. This is a fact that is well known in the transportation
community, which the counts of long dwell times attempted to capture. In retrospect, the
dwell time metric does not provide useful information for dispatchers because it captures
two different problems that may require different. actions. However, these could result from
heavy passenger loads or from dispatcher action.
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Daily Performance Report
Red Line
Tuesday 7/31/12
Big Gaps
Ashmont
42
Braintree
Performance Last 5 Days
9.
Headway Gaps 12
Big gaps In service between Alewife and JFK/UMass (greater than 7 minutes in the peak, 10 midday, and 9 all other times)
Early AM AM Peak Midday PM Peak Evening Late Night
2 5 6 4 0 7
Big gaps in service on the branches (greater than 12 minutes in the peak and 15 minutes off-peak)
Ashmont 2 5 7 5 1 3
Braintree 0 4 7 2 0 2
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Big gaps in service between JFKIUMass and Alewife (greater than 7 minutes in the peak, 10 midday, and 9 all other times)
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1 4 9 2 2 12
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Ashmont 1 2 8 2
Braintree 0 1 4 3
1
1
30
5 A: 19
11 B: 20
Trunk Headways at Park Street
20
li15
10
5
5:00 7:00 9:00 11:00 13:00 15:00
Time of Day
17:00 19:00 21:00 23:00 1:00
Long Dwell Times
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DRAFT - NOT ALL DATA FINAL
Figure 14: First Draft of Performance Report
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Objective Effectiveness
Capture speed - Long dwell metric attempts, but does not
capture trains slow in between stations
- Conflates holding and crowding
Capture frequency - Big Gaps measure instances of infrequency,
but no overall measure
e Headway charts provides some visualization
of frequency, but do not summarize
Capture reliability - Big Gaps capture unreliability
- Headway charts effectively visualize
reliability by highlighting variation in
headways
Sensitive to service variations that are - Big Gaps and dwells based on a threshold
perceptible to passengers that represents perceptibly bad headway
- Do not distinguish between bad and very
bad
Easily understood by OCC staff - Big Gap numbers are straightforward and
understood
e Headway charts are powerful visualization
Detailed enough to identify problems and - Headway charts provide detail to see
actions problems, and imply need to manage
headways
- Long dwell counts do not, since they may be
out of dispatch's control
Table 6: Summary of First Iteration of Performance Report
4.3 Modifications and Second Draft
Based on feedback from the OCC director, the report was modified to include additional
metrics that complement the big gaps measure better than the counts of long dwells. Adding
the number of slow trains attempts to address the concern that dispatchers could hold trains
to maintain headway, similar to the previous dwell time metric. Dispatchers are strongly
discouraged from expressing trains, so in the MBTA case counting express trains does not
add much information. An analysis of the distribution of train running times, shown in
Figure 15, revealed that the distributions were fairly tight. Figure 15 shows the median
running times for each major segment of the Red Line by period. The error bars that extend
to the 10h and 9 0 th percentile values for the running time distribution. The length of the
error bar represents the variability in running times. Variability is significantly higher on the
trunk than the branches. However, the largest change between the median and the 9 0 th
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percentile was 23% (Alewife-JFK, Evening). A threshold for slow trains was set at 15%
longer than the median running time for the period. This first iteration of the slow trains
metric was based on end-to-end run times (from leaving the first stop to arriving at the
terminus), which includes dwell times at all intermediate stations. The slow trains metric
replaces the long dwell time metric from the first draft, as it captures both long dwell and
running times. It still does not differentiate between slowness due to holding and slowness
due to crowding, however. From a passenger perspective, a slow train is inconvenient
regardless of its cause, but this may reduce the usefulness of the metric for management.
Since big gaps describe the tails of the headway distribution, the second draft of the report
incorporates a measure of service regularity to capture the variation within the full
distribution. The objective is to measure the degree of variation in headways, as the graphs
on the initial report show headway deviations that do not create big gaps. Variations in
headway create uneven train loads, extending dwell time and potentially causing delays. The
MBTA's real-time signs displaying the time until the next train add to the importance of
consistent service. Customers can now see the time until their train and the train behind it,
Median Running Times by Segment and Period, with
10th and 90th Percentile Error Bars
0:4500 N Ear* Monng M AM Peak
:a M dcy a PM Peak
a E/enng a Lat Nifht
035iJ0
c 0:15-00--
025:00
ET
0)
C
C O15-
0:100
00500
Brahtree -JFK Ashmont -JFK JFK- Alewfe Alewfe - JFK JFK- Brantree JFK-Ashntn
Segment
Figure 15: Median, 1 0 th, and 9 0 th Percentile Running Times for the Red Line by Period and
Segment
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which can cause frustration if they have a long wait and see that the second train is just
behind the first.
The Level of Service (LOS) metric from TCRP Report 88 measures the standard deviation
of differences from the scheduled headway and maps it to an LOS grade, which mimics the
highway LOS grade (TCRP 2003). The calculation, as shown in Equation 1, first calculates
the difference between the actual and scheduled headway for all trains in a period (during
which the scheduled headway is constant). It then takes the standard deviation of this
distribution, and divides this by the scheduled headway. This is effectively a normalized
standard deviation, relating variations in the headway to its scheduled value.
SD{h 1 - hs, h 2 -hs, ---, hi - hs}
hs
Equation 1: Transit LOS
Where:
hi = headway for train i
hs =scheduled headway during a period of consistent headways
SD {... } denotes the standard deviation of the set of headway deviations
The result is a number usually between 0 and 1, with 0 indicating no deviation from the
scheduled headway. TCRP Report 88 maps this metric to letter grades as shown in Table 7.
Grade Range Points
A 0.00-0.21 4
B 0.21 - 0.30 3
C 0.30 - 0.39 2
D 0.39 - 0.52 1
E 0.52 -0.74 1/3
F > 0.74 0
Table 7: LOS Grades
In this research, an aggregate grade for multiple periods with different scheduled headways is
calculated using a weighted grade point average (GPA). Each grade is assigned a point value,
as with academic grades (shown in Table 7), which are weighted by the duration of the
period as a fraction of the service day (i.e. the AM Peak is 3 of the 20 service hours so its
weight is .15). The total weighted GPA is the sum of the weighted GPAs for each period,
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which is then translated back into a grade (i.e. a 2.5 is a C, a 3.5 a B). The advantage of this is
that it provides a single grade for the entire day. The disadvantage is that it does not weight
by passenger levels, in fact the peak periods with the most passengers are shorter and thus
receive less weight. This was intentional, based on a judgment that regularity is more
important in the off-peak periods with longer scheduled headways. An alternative would be
to weight by passenger volume, to create a combined weight that takes multiple factors into
account, or to aggregate peak and off-peak service separately.
4.3.1 Presentation
As shown in Figure 16, in the second iteration of the performance report the big gaps
measurement is augmented by the LOS and slow trains totals. The report presents
information about multiple dimensions of service together. The intention is to emphasize
these as equally important and allow correlations to be drawn between them. For example,
holding trains at stations to adjust for headways would likely result in a low number of big
gaps, but a higher number of slow trains. This research theorized that seeing such values for
a day when dispatchers recall holding a lot of trains would underscore both the positive and
negative consequences of holding for headway adjustments. The graph charting the
performance of the past five days' performance was removed for technical production
reasons. At this stage in its development, the reports had moved from proof-of-concept to a
preliminary level of production. The algorithms were creating performance metrics on-
demand, but not storing them, so the data structure to produce historic comparisons did not
exist. The concept of comparing a day to historical performance is reintroduced in
subsequent drafts.
On this particularly day on the Blue Line, service was generally consistent, with very few big
headway gaps or slow trains. Values for each of the measurements are provided by period
and direction below. Providing information about which periods are performing poorly
allows dispatchers to focus their management efforts. The headway graph provides detail to
substantiate the big gaps and LOS measurements. The legend at the bottom explains the
methodology behind each of the calculations. This allows people viewing the report to
understand what the numbers are based on and thus how to influence them.
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4.3.2 Reaction and Input of Operations Personnel
The incorporation of the additional measurements was received positively, though the letter
grade was viewed as somewhat harsh. One operations manager commented that it seemed
impossible for service to get above a C, even when everything else looked good. This was
discouraging to managers and dispatchers. Their reactions began a conversation about
whether to compare to a theoretical ideal (i.e. zero big gaps, no variation in headways, no
slow trains) or to an observed achievable level of good service. The next draft of the report
attempts to address this dilemma.
These drafts of the reports were used to evaluate the effects of the pilot programs (discussed
in Chapter 5). Managers received these reports frequently for several weeks. In meetings
with them, we observed that managers paid attention to the top-level numbers and the
headway graphs. The breakdowns by period and direction were less important. Another
operations manager commented that the report gave him an easy way to investigate
customer or employee complaints of long headways because he could simply look at the
headway plot. This implies that the intermediate levels of aggregation to the line and
direction were not adding useful information for the managers. The combination of
summary numbers for the entire day and the detailed graphs showing every train provided
enough information to understand how service was that day and what was driving the
numbers.
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Blue Line Big Gaps' Regularity2  Slow Trains3
Daily Performance
Tuesday
1/15/13
Headway Performance
Service Regularity (based on deviations from the scheduled headway) Overall
Early AM AM Peak Midday PM Peak Evening Late Night
B B B C A A
Big gaps in service (greater than 7.5 minutes in the peaks, 12 minutes off-peak and 16 minutes late night)
0 1 0 1 0 2
Headways at AirportA Big Gap + Big Gap at Terminal
D 25
. E 20
-_Z 15
0
5:00 6:00 7:00 8:00 9:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 0:00 1:00
Slow Trains (Trains taking more than 15% longer than the long-term median travel time for the period to complete a half ti Overall
Early AM AM Peak Midday PM Peak Evening Late Night 50 2 2 0 0 1
Weekday Average Headway Performance
Service Regularity (based on deviations from the scheduled headway) Overall
Early AM AM Peak Midday PM Peak Evening Late Night
B B B C B C
Big gaps in service (greater than 7.5 minutes in the peaks, 12 minutes off-peak and 16 minutes late night)
0 1 0 2 0 3
-o Headways at Airport A Big Gap + Big Gap at Terminal
o ~25
- 20E
153:10
0
5:00 6:00 7:00 8:00 9:00 10:0011:0012: 0013:0014:0015:0016:0017:0018:0019:0020:0021:0022:0023:00 0:00 1:00
Slow 'rains (irains taking more than 15% longer than the long-term median travel time for the period to complete a half trip)
Early AM AM Peak Midday PM Peak Evening Late Night
0 0 0 0 0 1
1. The standard for a big gap is either 1.5 times or 3 minutes greater than the scheduled headway, whichever is lower.
2. Headway regularity is calculated by taking the standard deviation of the differences from the scheduled headway (actual -
scheduled and dividing by the scheduled headway. The ratio must be below .21 for an A, .3 for a B, .39 for a C, .52 for a D,
and .74 for an E.
Figure 16: Second Draft of Performance Report
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Objective
Capture speed
Effectiveness
- Slow train metric captures trains delayed by
the end of their trip
" Still conflates holding and crowding, and
also bunching
Capture frequency
Capture reliability
Sensitive to service variations that are
perceptible to passengers
Easily understood by OCC staff
Detailed enough to identify problems and
actions
* Big Gaps measure instances of infrequency,
but no overall metric
- Headway chart provides some visualization
of frequency, but does not summarize
* Big Gaps capture unreliability
e LOS grades provide quantitative measure of
overall regularity
- Headway charts effectively visualize
reliability by highlighting variation in
headways
- Big Gaps based on a threshold that
represents perceptibly bad headway
- LOS grades represent noticeable change in
regularity from one to next
* Big Gap numbers are straightforward and
understood
- Headway charts are powerful visualization
that managers can actually use
- LOS grades are opaque in their calculation;
improvements within one grade level are
not shown
- Headway charts provide detail to see
problems, and imply need to manage
headways
- LOS grades and big gap counts are too
aggregate to identify specific issues
- Slow trains are counted but detail is not
shown
Table 8: Summary of Second Iteration of Performance Report
4.4 Third Draft: Refocusing the Reports on Passenger Impacts
While conducting pilot projects, passenger volumes were incorporated into estimates of
travel time to emphasize how many people experienced service improvements. These
numbers resonated with the operations managers, providing motivation to translate the
performance metric into units of customers or customer hours rather than trains.
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4.4.1 Passenger-Weighted Metrics
O-D data estimated from AFC data, as described by Gordon (2012) produces detailed
passenger demand information. These measures include customer boardings at a station and
total riders between any two stations during any given period. This enables the performance
of each train to be weighted by the expected number of customers experiencing that service.
For example, a nine-minute headway at rush hour affects more people than in the late night,
though both are big gaps. In the case of branched services, arrival rates for trunk-bound and
branch-bound customers can be calculated individually to account for the fact that not all
passengers can take every train. This embeds an additional piece of information in the
metrics: the impact of performance on passengers. Such information makes explicit the
relationship between the performance of trains and the experience of passengers, where it
was previously implied. Public transit is a service with the objective of moving people.
Measuring aspects of service that matter to customers enables operations personnel to
directly understand the impacts of their actions on achieving this objective.
These metrics employ historical passenger demand rather than real-time demand. The
MBTA's AFC data on passengers is not processed every day, and is thus not available on the
same basis as ATO information on train locations.
Passengers Affected by Headway Variation and Big Gaps
Counting the number of passengers that wait more than the published headway, a big gap, or
a very big gap (twice the headway), provides an estimate of how many people likely
perceived service as poor because they waited longer than they expected. The number of
people waiting longer than the published headway can be calculated by multiplying the
passenger arrival rate by the difference between the actual headway and the published
headway, as shown in Equation 2. This is the expected number of people arriving during
that interval who wait longer than the published headway. Passengers arriving after this
interval do not actually experience a long wait. Likewise, the number of passengers waiting
longer than a big gap or twice the headway is calculated by multiplying the arrival rate by the
difference between the scheduled headway and the respective threshold (varying the value of
h,). This gives the subset of those passengers with "extra" wait time who waited the longest.
These calculations can be done separately for passengers waiting for trunk and branch
services, using branch-specific arrival rates and headways.
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Equation 2: Passengers Affected by Big Gaps
Where:
passenger arrival rate for the period the headway occurs in
h, = headway for train i
b, headway threshold above which passengers are counted (scheduled
headway, big gap, etc.)
Summing over all periods and both trunk and branch services provides an estimate of the
total number of passengers who experienced a wait greater than what they should expect
based on the published schedule. This can also be expressed as a percentage - the
proportion of riders who wait too long - which is a salient figure for operations personnel.
Expected Total Passenger Wait Time
This metric is intended to capture the effect of service variability on passenger wait times.
Calculations of these metrics assume a constant passenger arrival rate. This rate is used to
calculate the number of passengers waiting and the total wait time for each train, assuming
all customers board the first train. Because each passenger that arrives waits a different
amount of time, longer headways have more passengers who have been waiting for a larger
total amount of time. Assuming passengers arrive at a regular rate (i.e. a random arrival
process), the average wait time is half the headway, and total wait is the total passengers
multiplied by the average wait. This formula is presented in Equation 3:
h
Average Wait = -
2
Total Passengers = A * h
Total Wait Time = A * h =
Equation 3: Total Passenger Wait Time for a Single Train
Where:
A = arrival rate of passengers
h headway
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As the final expression shows, total wait time grows geometrically rather than linearly, and
thus wait time will be longer with uneven headways than even headways.
With arrival rates for each station in each direction and for each branch the total wait for
each train at each station can be calculated. These are then summed to calculate total wait.
Equation 4 outlines the calculation of total wait time for non-branched service:
A0 (h?) 2
. 2
i 0
Equation 4: Total Passenger Wait Time for All Stations
Where:
, = passenger arrival rate at origin station o for period p
h? = headway for train i at station o
For branched services, the total wait time is then the sum of total wait time for each type of
passenger.
AO (h?)2 
'O h0pBZ B2
i 0 B iB oB
Equation 5: Total Passenger Wait Time for Branched Service
Where:
A4,' = arrival rate at origin station o of trunk-bound customers in periodpp
", arrival rate at station o of customers bound for branch B in period p
Lh? =headway for train i at station o (since last train for any branch)
h0B =branch headway for train i at station o serving branch B (since last train
for branch B)
Wilson and Attanucci (2011) develop an equivalent formulation of the average wait time.
E(w) = E(h) [1 + (cov(h))2 ]2 [1v+
Equation 6: Wilson and Attanucci's Formulation of Average Wait Time
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Where:
E(w) expected (average) wait time
E(b) expected value of the headway distribution
cov(h,) coefficient of variation of the headway distribution
Multiplying this by number of passengers provides an altemate method of estimating the
total passenger wait time. From this formulation, it is clear that the total passenger wait time
captures variation in the headway distribution, as it explicitly includes its COV.
Total Passenger Travel Time
Like total passenger wait time, total passenger travel time can be calculated based on O-D
matrices inferred from AFC data. The running time, including dwell time, for each train
between each possible O-D pair along its route can be calculated from the ATO train
location data. Multiplying this by the estimated passenger demand for each O-D pair served
by a train results in the total number of passenger-hours of travel time for that train.
Passenger demand per train can be calculated by multiplying the headway by the O-D-
specific arrival rate for the period. This is preferable to assuming even headways and
assigning an average passenger load to each train because more people experience the
performance of a train arriving after a long headway. Summing the number of passenger
hours for each train results in an aggregate total passenger travel time for the period. The
overall calculation is summarized in Equation 7.
J RTd y )(hPod 0)
t o d
Equation 7: Total Passenger Travel Time
Where:
RTO = running time for train i between stations o and d
Pd - passenger arrival rate at station o for station din period (p determined by
time at terminal station for train i)
h =0 - headway for train i at origin station o
This equation assumes that passengers that arrive while the train is dwelling in the station
board the next train, because the time after the first train's arrival in the station is part of the
following train's headway. It also assumes all passengers who arrive during a headway are
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able to board the first train that arrives, which is not always the case for long headways
during peak periods when crowds build up and vehicle capacity can be exceeded. This is an
important limitation that should be addressed in future performance metrics. None of the
metrics in this research quantified crowding, though this is a significant factor in transit
service quality.
Effective Headway
The effective headway is defined in this research as the average headway weighted by the
number of passengers experiencing each headway. This accounts for the fact that more
passengers arrive during a long headway than a short headway, so the average headway
experienced by a customer is higher than the average headway of the trains. Under the
assumption of random arrivals passengers wait on average half the headway, thus it is
calculated as twice the average wait time. The average wait time can be derived from
Equation 3 by summing total passenger wait time for a period and dividing by the total
number of passengers. Total passengers can be calculated as the arrival rate multiplied by the
period length, or the sum of all headways (since headways include dwell time).
( Ah 2 ) _ __hz_
HE= 2 = h
E Zi hi ZE hi
Equation 8: Effective Headway
Where:
HE Effective Headway
A =Passenger arrival rate
h, =Headway for train i
As seen in Equation 8, the passenger arrival rate cancels out in the effective headway
calculation, resulting in the total minutes of waiting divided by the period length. This makes
calculating the effective headway possible even without passenger O-D information over a
period with a constant arrival rate.
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4.4.2 Presentation of Passenger-Weighted Metrics
The structure of the first two iterations of performance reports was generally retained for the
third performance report draft (Figure 17), but with significant modifications to incorporate
lessons learned.
Top-level numbers that summarize overall performance on all directions and branches for
the whole day are given visual prominence. Passengers with long waits are expressed as a
percentage of total passengers, while passenger travel and wait time are expressed as a
change from the norm (defined by the long-term median). Expressing total passengers who
wait too long as both an absolute number and as a percentage is an easily understandable
measurement because it is simply a count of people and a proportion of passengers. Total
passenger travel and wait time may not be as useful as absolute statistics for management
because passenger-hours is a two-dimensional unit and it is not immediately obvious what
the total wait time should be. Comparing them to a normal day helps to make them more
understandable and useful as management tools. This measures service relative to a level that
operators know they can achieve and exceed, providing an incentive to always do better.
This iteration of the reports also introduces a measure ranking each metric to past
performance. The objective is to quantitatively express the managers' impressions of good
days and bad days. The bars below each metric place the value for that day relative to the
range and median for that metric in the preceding six-month period (i.e. days in the first half
of 2013 are compared to days in the last half of 2012)'. The light gray represents values
above the median, while dark gray is below median. This additional information helps put
the performance numbers in context. This graphic may make the relative change in travel
and wait time (described above) redundant. These reports are still evolving and exploring
alternative metrics such as the number of customers delayed by a specified number of
minutes.
The break down of the top-level measurements by period and direction is left out of this
report, as operations managers did not use it. The period-specific statistics were a numeric
summary of the information provided on the headway charts. They did not add any new
9 In the future this may be changed to the same month or quarter in the preceding year, but at the time of this
research, there vas not a full year of data.
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information because the graphs show the number of big gaps and the variation in headways.
These are replaced by an effective headway calculation for the period which quantifies the
graph in a simpler way. Instead of two quantifications for each period, there is one number
that that summarizes the variation in the chart in an intuitive unit (minutes). The headway
graph is similar to that presented in the previous report, with the addition of the effective
headway and markers for branch-specific big gaps (i.e. a big gap in Ashmont service). The
graph serves as an explanation for the top-level passenger wait-time metric.
The slow trains metric has been converted into a series of charts that display running times
for each major segment of a line, rather than just the end-to-end time. This change came
about during the Alewife pilot (see Chapter 5) where an analysis of running times by station
segment showed that specific stations and segments accounted for most of the variability in
running times. The same standard for slow trains is applied (15% longer than the median),
and the bars for slow trains on a segment are highlighted for emphasis. These charts provide
the detail of what is driving the top-level passenger travel time metric.
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Daily Performance Red Line Thursday, 05/09/13
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Figure 17: Third Draft of Performance Report Incorporating Passenger-Weighted Metrics
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Objective
Capture speed
Effectiveness
- Passenger travel time metric summarizes
overall speed
- Slow train graphic shows detail of speed by
segment for each trip
- Still conflates holding, crowding, and
bunching
Capture frequency
Capture reliability
Sensitive to service variations that are
perceptible to passengers
Easily understood by OCC staff
Detailed enough to identify problems and
actions
- Passengers experiencing Big Gaps captures
instances of infrequency
e Change in total passenger wait time
represents change in overall frequency
e Effective headways represent average
frequency experienced by passengers
- Passengers experiencing gaps capture
experienced unreliability
- Relative measures of travel time and wait
time represent change from other days,
which captures consistency
" Headway and run time graphs effectively
visualize reliability by making highlighting
variation in headways
- Multiple thresholds for long passenger waits
distinguish between bad and very bad
- Metrics capture minute variations in service,
but normalizing and limiting significant
digits limits variation in numbers to large
changes
- Big Gap percentages, slow trains, and
headway charts are easily understood
- Relative change in passenger travel time
and relative position are less intuitive
e Headway charts and slow train graphics
provide detail to see problems
- Slow trains show both when and where
problem occurs
Table 9: Summary of Third Iteration of Performance Report
4.5 Lessons Learned about Performance Reporting
The iterative process of developing these reports revealed several important lessons about
performance measurement and performance reporting.
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Because service is multi-dimensional a single number summary is often inadequate. The
information about which dimension is driving performance is important to developing
knowledge. Metrics should reflect aspects of service that customers care about. For frequent
services this is regular headways and travel time. While dispatchers talked about getting trains
back "on-time," they often modified the schedules to re-establish the headways between
trains, reflecting their understanding that headway is more important than schedule.
Dispatchers and managers often commented that a bad headway at 11:00 PM was less
detrimental to service than a bad headway during the rush hour because it affected fewer
passengers. Weighting by passenger demand qualifies service issues by the number of
passengers affected. While dispatchers recognize that their objective is to provide high
quality service at all times, incorporating passenger volumes emphasizes that the point of
transit service is to move people, not just vehicles.
Finally, the process of developing new performance reports shows that design and
presentation of performance metrics is just as important as the metrics themselves. The
iterative process and pilot programs created a feedback loop that informed the evolution of
the reports. Circulating draft reports helps to determine if the information is enabling useful
knowledge.
The OCC expressed interest in the report answering two primary questions: 1) How good or
bad was service yesterday? and 2) What caused the numbers to change? The top-level
summary numbers in the latest revision of the report mimic the single OTP number, but
reflect multiple dilensions of service (wait versus travel time) and the degree of passenger
impacts. Breaking down the top-level numbers into smaller levels of aggregation does not
add as much value as providing detail on every train through visual techniques. Graphs of
headways and running times are an effective way to communicate details down to the
individual train without overwhelming the viewer with numbers. Graphics can communicate
which trains were driving the performance numbers by emphasizing the information that
matters for service. The line on the headway graph emphasizes the change from one
headway to the next rather than the headways themselves, since the objective is regularity.
The only points that are highlighted are the big gaps, since these negatively impact
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performance. The same is true of the slow train graphs. A cluster of red bars indicates a
bigger problem than a single slow train.
These design choices are intended to reflect how customers perceive service. The
presentation implies that as long as headways are below a certain threshold, passengers care
more about regularity and predictability than they do about the actual headway. Similarly, for
running time, only the high running times are colored, since these cause trips to take longer
than customers expect.
Performance reporting is an important component in a data-driven performance
management strategy. However, reporting alone does not produce performance
improvements. Combining the development of new performance reports with operational
pilot projects allows the reports to be tested and refined. Additionally, it helps identify other
opportunities for change. The performance improvement process and its synergies with the
performance reporting process are discussed in the next chapter.
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Applying Information to Support
Change and Innovation
The previous stages of this project have focused on harnessing automated data to create
performance reports. While performance information is a necessary part of performance
management, its mere existence does not impact service. This portion of the research
leverages performance information to make service improvements at the MBTA. The
objective is to demonstrate the value of new performance information and build support
with those in control of service. The original intention was to establish internal comfort with
the reports so that they could be made public. This has evolved to include improving service
before releasing numbers publicly. The intended internal audience began as operations
control managers and dispatchers, but has expanded to service planning and other
management staff. The eventual audience is intended to include the general public. As
discussed in Chapter 2, knowledge results from interpreting information and understanding
how to influence the present situation. Enabling performance information to impact service
thus means getting service controllers to engage with the information, to become
comfortable with it, and to trust it. This chapter discusses two pilot projects that modified
service based on analyses of automated data. This serves to validate both the understanding
that can be drawn from performance information and its ability to capture changes in service
quality. This is a departure from the standard research process where the information to
knowledge transition is simply assumed to occur.
This chapter discusses the institutional process of designing and implementing these pilot
projects within the bureaucratic, public sector context that characterizes the MBTA. It
describes how internal support for the pilots was obtained and how this aligns with the
literature on innovation in the public sector. It then describes the pilot projects themselves
and their results. Finally, it discusses the impact the pilots had on the use and acceptance of
performance information by MBTA operations managers.
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Altshuler and Zegans' observations about successful innovation in the public sector
(Altshuler and Zegans 1997) help to explain why these pilot projects have been accepted by
the OCC.
* Firstly, they are incremental modifications to existing operating procedure
that are zero or low cost both monetarily and in terms of new work for
managers.
e Secondly, they attempt to address existing problems, and if successful they
make dispatchers' jobs easier.
* Thirdly, there has been institutional support for making measurable
improvements to performance at multiple levels within the organization. It
originated from the Secretary of Transportation and Director of Innovation,
extended from General Manager down through the OCC Director, and has
been espoused by the dispatchers, supervisors, and line managers (see Figure
4 for organizational chart).
* Fourthly, the pilots have been developed in close collaboration with the
OCC and incorporate their feedback, underscoring that the intention is not
to tell dispatchers how to do their job. They are also low-risk because service
in the targeted areas was poor, so failure is not noticeable outside of the
OCC. This may have helped to avoid the institutional resistance to change
observed by Behn (1997).
* Finally, consistent with the observations from Blau (1963), staff who are
dedicated to the mission of the organization like the COO & OCC director,
have been supportive of innovations that help it better serve its purpose.
5.1 Generating Institutional Interest in and Support for Performance
Improvement
Identifying the stakeholders and partners to provide support within the institution for
performance reporting and management is a critical first step the collaborative process
followed in this work. The Secretary of Transportation, who was previously GM of the
MBTA, has emphasized a need for the agency to become more customer-oriented. To this
end he has provided key institutional motivation and support for innovative projects. In this
case, the Director of Innovation for the MBTA, who is tasked with improving the customer
experience through new technology, became interested in performance management as part
of a project to display real-time train arrivals in rapid transit stations. Because the MBTA is
now quantifying service for customers by displaying the headways, he felt there should also
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be an emphasis on improving service (and eventually communicating this improvement to
the public). As an agent with the support of the General Manager, he has been able to
engage the Director of the OCC who felt that the current numbers were not an accurate
reflection of performance and was open to new performance reports. The OCC director has
thus become the primary point of contact within operations staff for feedback on the reports,
while also opening up contact with the supervisors and dispatchers in the OCC who are
directly responsible for service delivery.
Developing the new performance reports in collaboration with operations control managers
(as described in Chapter 4) has involved the OCC director and some line managers seeing
performance information regularly. This has revealed areas and times with consistently poor
performance on all lines. The Red Line was selected for further investigation because it
carries substantially more passengers than the other rapid transit lines - 317,000 on the Red
versus 197,000 on the Orange and 68,000 on the Blue' - and thus receives more
institutional attention. It is also a two-branch line, running from either Ashmont or Braintree
in the southern part of the metropolitan area through Boston and Cambridge to Alewife in
the near northwestern suburbs. This branching structure creates more operational issues
than the Orange and Blue lines. For both of these reasons, it receives two dispatchers, while
Blue and Orange have one each.
Specifically, northbound service on the Red Line has been known to be inconsistent, most
noticeably in off-peak periods, frequently alternating between short headways and big gaps.
Additionally, travel time between Davis (the penultimate northbound station) and Alewife in
the peaks is significantly slower than at other times. Working with OCC dispatchers and
managers on the reports has provided an opportunity to discuss these observations. They
have also identified these areas of poor performance in their experience managing service,
but note that their on-time performance is always over 90%. This served as an initial
confirmation that the proposed performance measures can identify operational issues more
accurately than the OTP reports.
10 These numbers are based on the AFC analysis that generated the origin-destination information used in the
reports, and thus differ from the MBTA's published figures. They include passengers who enter on another line
and transfer. This measures the total number of people experiencing the service of a line. Passengers who
transfers are counted on all lines they take.
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Figure 18: Red Line Diagram
Conversations with OCC staff led to ideas for pilot projects that might address these issues.
The first pilot project has delayed departures from Braintree in an attempt to reduce
northbound bunching on the Red Line, and the second staffed additional drivers at Alewife
to help turn trains more quickly in the PM peak. Figure 18 shows the layout of the Red Line,
for context.
5.2 Implementation and Results of the Pilot Improvement Projects
As noted previously, working to develop performance reports has revealed segments and
times of day that consistently underperform. While OCC staff are aware of these issues, they
have had no quantitative evidence of how they impact performance. The same data
underlying the performance reports has been analyzed in greater detail to gain further insight
into two problems: 1) bunching of northbound service, and 2) northbound delays heading
into Alewife. While these issues are not the only ones on the Red Line, they can be
addressed by the OCC internally, and thus quickly. Involving other departments may slow
the process, since the specialized nature of bureaucracy limits collaboration between
departments.
5.2.1 Braintree Offset
The first pilot stems from the observation that the headway graphs in the reports were
showing significant variation on the northbound segment of the trunk (after the merger of
the Ashmont and Braintree branches), with headways alternating between big gaps and
bunches. This suggests poor coordination between the departures of trains from each of the
branches. An analysis of historical running times and scheduled running times indicates that
too much time has been scheduled between Braintree and the merge point at JFK/UMass.
As shown in Table 10, the 90 percentile of the running time distribution is lower than the
scheduled running time, even in the morning peak when northbound demand is highest and
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trains are most likely to be slow. Standard industry practice is to schedule arrivals at non-
terminal stops at the median of the distribution, and arrival at the terminal at the 90' or 95b
percentile to allow enough time to recover for the next trip (Wilson 2011).
Period Percentile of Running Time Distribution Scheduled
1 0 th 20th 50th 80th 90th Time
Early Morning 17:26 17:41 18:17 19:17 20:15 20:00
AM Peak 18:03 18:24 19:14 20:34 21:33 22:00
Midday 17:38 17:54 18:33 19:38 20:35 22:00
PM Peak 17:35 17:52 18:33 19:45 20:58 22:00
Evening 17:23 17:37 18:12 19:10 20:18 22:00
Late Night 17:10 17:22 17:53 18:43 19:27 21:00
Table 10: Distribution of Braintree-JFK/UMass Weekday Running Times
The pilot project initially delayed departures from Braintree by two minutes, which is the
approximate difference between the median and scheduled run times. It then evaluated the
change in northbound headway regularity. The OCC has been supportive of this project
because they have brought up this issue with the scheduling department previously, and the
pilot required only passive input on their part - simply modifying departure times. The pilot
initially targeted the off-peak midday, evening, and late-night periods to avoid impacting rush
hour service if unsuccessful. The pilot was conducted on four days in the fall of 2012:
September 2 5 't and 27*, and October 2 "d and 4*.
The results of this initial pilot were positive, though not statistically significant due to small
sample size. On the days when the pilot was running, the periods when the schedule was
modified generally perform at a better (lower) percentile for coefficient of variation (COV,
measuring variability) than the same period on other days and than other periods on the
same day. In Table 11 and Table 12, shading indicates a day when the pilot was running, and
red text indicates the periods when the schedule has actually been changed. With the
exception of Thursday September 2 71h, big gaps during the pilot periods are at a lower
percentile of the distribution for that period, compared to surrounding periods. The results
indicate that the pilot schedule seems to have had a larger effect on improving the regularity
(measured by COV), than on reducing big gaps. This may be because COV captures changes
in the full distribution, while big gaps only capture changes in values around its threshold.
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COV thus changes when uneven headways that are below the big gap threshold become
more regular. Big gaps only change when a headway
Date
9-24
9-25
9-26
9-27
9-28
10-1
10-2
10-3
10-4
Early AM
8.0%
20.6%
56.3%
71.2%
85.0%
26.4%
73.5%
75.8%
2.2%
crosses the threshold .
AM Peak Midday PM Peak
34.0% 87.5% 27.2%
64.7% 20.4% 30.6%
5.6% 10.2% 2.2%
37.5% 31.8% 7.9%
69.3% 46.5% 10.2%
48.8% 50.0% 23.8%
59.0% 22.7% 60.2%
20.4% 57.9% 29.5%
12.5% 6.8% 39.7%
Evening
6.8%
2 8.4%
7.9%
3.4%
1.1%
25.0%
79.5%
84.0%
53.4%
Night
56.1%
24.7%
52.8%
22.4%
44.9%
95.5%
68.5%
70.7%
56.1%
Table 11: COV Performance Percentile by Period for Pilot and Surrounding Days in the
Distribution of the Past 125 Days
Date Early AM AM Peak Midday PM Peak Evening Night
9-24 3.4% 94.3% 80.6% 61.3% 15.9% 5.6%
9-25 3.4% 63.6% 23.8% 43.1% 15.9% 42.6%
9-26 55.1% 4.5% 23.8% 0.0% 15.9% 15.7%
9-27 55.1% 40.9% 48.8% 0.0% 0.0% 15.7%
9-28 3.4% 63.6% 23.8% 0.0% 0.0% 15.7%
10-1 3.4% 27.2% 48.8% 43.1% 96.5% 87.6%
10-2 90.8% 63.6% 23.8% 78.4% 15.9% 87.6%
10-3 55.1% 27.2% 48.8% 43.1% 48.8% 56.1%
10-4 55.1% 4.5% 23.8% 78.4% 15.9% 15.7%
Table 12: Big Gap Performance Percentile by Period for Pilot and Surrounding Days in the
Distribution of the Past 125 Days
The success of this pilot prompted operations to request a meeting with scheduling to
discuss the results. In addition to the analysis of Braintree-to-JFK running times, the OCC
director requested an analysis of turning times at Ashmont. The OCC observed that trains
frequently did not have enough slack time at Ashmont, particularly since the introduction of
single-person train operation (SPTO). Prior to SPTO, trains had a motorperson at the front
and a conductor in the middle, which could speed turning a train because the conductor had
half the distance to walk to the other end. A single driver must shut down the train while
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walking to the other end and then start it back up. A conductor on the train can head to the
front of the train and switch its driving end while the operator walks forward, saving up to
several minutes. There was no pilot for this problem because it would have required broader
scheduling changes.
The scheduling department has been receptive to the running time analyses. They lack
sufficient staff to analyze rail running times regularly, so these analyses fill an acknowledged
hole in their work. The scheduling department agreed to incorporate the revised branch
running times into the upcoming schedule, which went into effect on January 2, 2013. The
results of the schedule change have been significant improvements in headway regularity,
particularly in the off-peaks and weekends.
Figure 19 - Figure 25 show the distribution of the effective headway metric (measured at
Park Street) for the second half of 2012 versus the first quarter of 2013. The effective
headway metric is calculated for each period and direction each day, so each day is one
observation. The distributions for all periods except the late night have tightened, with peaks
closer to the scheduled headway for the period. It is important to note that increasing the
turn time for Ashmont trains has required increasing the branch headway from 13 to 14
minutes in the midday (6.5 to 7 minutes on the trunk). Because trains were better spaced on
the trunk, the average headway that most passengers experienced actually decreased, despite
the scheduled increase. Looking at where the distribution intersects the scheduled headway,
20% of passengers in the midday experience the expected headway, which is a dramatic
increase over the 2% in the previous schedule. On Saturdays, the change was also dramatic.
Under the old schedule the distribution was almost bimodal, while under the new schedule it
is closer to the expected normal distribution.
As shown in Table 13, both the median and 9 0 'h percentile effective headway have fallen in
almost all periods except the AM Peak. The drop was most dramatic for the weekends. The
weekend graphs show a more varied distribution due to their smaller sample size (only one
of each day per week), so one bad day can skew it.
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Median (minutes) 9 0 th Percentile (minutes)
Period Pre Post Change Pre Post Change
AM Peak 5.1 5.1 0.0 5.8 7.6 1.8
Midday 7.3 7.3 -0.1 8.0 8.1 0.2
PM Peak 5.5 5.3 -0.2 6.5 6.1 -0.3
Evening 6.4 6.1 -0.3 7.8 7.1 -0.6
Night 7.7 7.8 0.0 9.0 8.7 -0.2
Saturday 9.0 7.9 -1.0 11.7 8.8 -2.9
Sunday 9.5 8.9 -0.5 11.4 10.2 -1.1
Table 13: Change in Distribution of Effective Headways From 2013 Schedule
Northbound AM Peak
Jun-Nov 2012 (n=1 26)
-- -Jan-Apr 2313 (n=65)
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Figure 19: Red Line Effective Headways, AM Peak
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Figure 20: Red Line Effective Headways, Midday
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Figure 21: Red Line Effective Headways, PM Peak
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Figure 22: Red Line Effective Headways, Evening
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Figure 23: Red Line Effective Headways, Night
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Figure 24: Red Line Effective Headways, Saturday
Northbound Sunday
25.0% - Jun-Nov 212 (n=28)
200% ---- Jan-Ag 2013 (n=12)
- 0 
- ---Schdidd
15.0%
10.0%
L5.0%
0.0%
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Effective Headway (Min)
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5.2.2 Alewife Quick Turn
The second pilot originated from dispatcher complaints that northbound trains bunch
outside of Alewife in the peaks. Red Line trains are scheduled to arrive and depart with 4-5
minute headways in these periods. Turning the train at Alewife also takes about four
minutes: the driver has to close the doors, walk to the other end, and then reopen the doors
and let passengers board. This has been exacerbated with the introduction of SPTO on
March 2 5tIh 2012, since there was no longer a conductor to help turn the train. A train
arriving late blocks one of the platforms for at least one headway and backs up service
outside of Alewife, aggravating customers and potentially making them miss bus connections.
Because Alewife is a stub-end terminal, trains berthed on its northern track must cross to the
southbound track, and crossover speed is limited to 10 miles-per-hour. Clearing the northern
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platform takes at least a minute longer than clearing the southern track. See Figure 26 for a
diagram of the track layout. These factors increase variability and allows headway gaps to
ricochet to southbound service. Table 14 below shows the minimum, median, and maximum
number of trains held during weekdays from June 1" and October 2 "d 2012 (before the pilot).
AM Peak Midday PM Peak Evening Late Night Weekend
Minimum 0% 4% 0% 0% 0% 1%
Median 48% 20% 48% 47% 11% 5%
Maximum 82% 51% 70% 100% 43% 17%
Table 14: Percent of Trains Held for More Than 2 Minutes Outside Alewife Each Day
During the three-hour peaks on a normal day, nearly half of all trains were held outside of
Alewife for more than two minutes, inconveniencing thousands of customers. By contrast,
on a median day 20% of trains were held in the midday. As shown in Table 15, the average
hold lasted 3:47, which is longer than that the uncongested trip between Davis and Alewife.
Non-Delayed Delayed Delay Duration
3:21 7:07 3:47
Table 15: Average Travel Time from Davis to Alewife
The pilot project has staffed additional operators" at Alewife who take control of the train
and drive it southbound when there is insufficient recovery time. The original operator stays
on the train and retakes control at Davis, while the spare operator returns to Alewife. The
pilot ran from 4:00-7:00 PM on six days in December 2012.
Ale ifeTo Davis --
Figure 26: Alewife Track Layout Showing Train Crossing to Southbound Track
"It is unusual that an agency has additional operators during the PM peak, but because the MBTA had just
moved to SPTO on the Red Line, it had a number of operators that in non-driving positions around the system.
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The results of the initial pilot project were positive, and it has been well-received by the
dispatchers and OCC managers. Detailed results include:
- The average number of trains delayed" fell from 17 to 9 per PM rush. Those delayed
trains were held for an average of 45 seconds less, and the distribution tightened,
with the 90 * percentile of holds falling by more than 2 minutes.
* The average running time from Downtown Crossing to Alewife and back (omitting
the dwell time at Alewife) was reduced during the pilot by 3:31 seconds (7%).
e Running times from Central to Alewife fell an average of 116 seconds per train, with
the worst day during the initial pilot still reducing running times in this section by 45
seconds on average, and the best day by 2 minutes 32 seconds.
* Total big gaps at all stations between Broadway (northbound) and Downtown
Crossing (southbound) were reduced form 8% to 4%
* The COV of headways fell by 10-20% in the area affected by delays: Harvard
northbound to Downtown Crossing southbound
- The reliability buffer time (the difference between 50th and 95h percentile) for
running time was reduced by 50 seconds per segment on average
The success of this pilot has led the director of the OCC to commit to having reserve
operators stationed at Alewife for the PM peak in subsequent crew schedules, starting on
January 2, 2013. The results of this extended pilot have been positive, particularly in relieving
pressure on the Davis-to-Alewife segment, which was the primary goal. Through March of
2013, the median travel time between Davis and Alewife have fallen by 15%, or about 40
seconds. The 90* percentile of running times for this segment also dropped by 40 seconds,
indicating that the worst delays have improved.
Median 90 Median 9 0th
Period Median 9 0th Savings Savings Savings % Savings %
Pre-pilot 4.7 7.6 - - - -
Pilot 3.6 6.1 1.1 1.5 24% 20%
2013 4.1 7.0 0.7 0.6 14% 8%
Table 16: Running Times between Davis and Alewife (minutes)
12 Defined as taking longer than 5:20 between arriving at Davis and arriving at Alewife, which is 2 minutes
longer than the median travel time
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The average number of trips taking longer than five minutes between Davis and Alewife has
dropped by 30% from 17 to 12 per day. Likewise, the average number of trips taking longer
than 7 minutes dropped 30% from 5.5 to 3.8. This means fewer passengers are experiencing
long holds outside of Alewife. Before the pilot, 43% of PM Peak trips took longer than 5
minutes, now that is only 32%. The benefits have diminished since the initial pilot, however.
Period Taking > 5 min. Taking > 7 min.
Pre-pilot 43% 14%
Pilot 23% 3%
2013 32% 10%
Table 17: Percent of Slow Davis-Alewife in PM Peak
Average Northbound Segment and Total Travel Time
a normal
m pilot (D
e 24:00 06:00 E
E
18:00 04:30
12:00 03:00 c:
E
o 06:00 01:30
00:00 - -- 00:00
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Park Charles Kendall Central Harvard Porter Davis Alewife
Figure 27: Change in Average Northbound Travel Time
Average Southbound Segment and Total Travel Time
mnnormal
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00:00 00:00
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Figure 28: Change in Average Southbound Travel Time
93
The improvement between Alewife and Davis has positive consequences for the trip from
Downtown Crossing to Alewife and back southbound from Alewife to Downtown Crossing.
The average northbound travel time in the PM Peak has dropped 1:30, or about 6%, and
average southbound travel time has also dropped 5%, as shown in Figure 27 and Figure 28.
This reduction in the benefits from the initial pilot to its extended implementation has
several possible explanations. In showing these statistics to the OCC Director, he noted that
additional drivers are not always available for quick turns because they are used to cover
shifts when drivers call out sick. He also suggested that the high degree of management
attention paid to Alewife during the initial pilot was a significant factor in its success. In the
initial pilot, there was an instructor and supervisor at Alewife in addition to the reserve
operators. The OCC Director stated that management presence often results in more
prompt driver performance. In addition to the management presence in the field, there was
also additional management attention on the dispatchers in the control room. The OCC
director was present in the control room during much of the initial pilot and made it clear
that turning trains at Alewife quickly was a priority. MIT researchers were also present.
While not authoritative, the presence of outsiders may have also induced dispatchers to pay
more attention to the terminal. Making information publicly available may have an analogous
effect.
5.3 Impact of the Pilot Projects on Institutional Acceptance of
Performance Information
The pilot projects have also served as a test implementation of the performance reports,
revealing areas for improvement in the reports that are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
The performance reports have been used as both a basis for developing the pilot projects
and as a tool for measuring their effect. The intention has been to demonstrate the
capabilities of performance measures and analysis (1) to address operational issues and (2) to
effectively reflect variations in service. The pilot projects have been an opportunity for
M1BTA personnel to see rail performance information on a daily basis. Receiving reports on
a regular basis during the pilot projects has given operations managers the opportunity to see
the metrics on various days under different conditions and become familiar with how the
numbers and charts relate to their experience in the control center. The fact that both pilots
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have been extended suggests that MBTA staff view the quantitative information favorably.
This is supported by conversations with staff about the reports and pilot programs.
In discussing adjustments to the Braintree departure times, multiple dispatchers have said
that they knew the schedule was inaccurate because they often slowed down Braintree trains
to stagger arrivals at the junction, while Ashmont trains often did not have enough time to
turn around. While OCC managers said they had complained to the scheduling department
before, there was no quantitative evidence because the reports showed high OTP. OCC staff
may have accepted new performance reports despite them showing worse performance in
part because they confirmed their intuition that the trains were poorly scheduled.
Rescheduling the Red Line based on revised running times has made the dispatchers' work
easier. Moreover, it validates their experience of service. Both of these facts may help to
justify the reports in their eyes.
Another sign that OCC managers value the performance information was a conversation
with the Line Manager for the Red Line. After receiving performance reports regularly as
part of the Alewife pilot, he mentioned that they were also useful for investigating customer
complaints. When customers would complain about a long wait at a specific time, he would
look at the headway chart to verify their claim and respond to it. In his words, "this gives me
everything I need to know."
In discussing the results of the extended implementation of the Alewife pilot (first quarter of
2013) with the Director of the OCC, he noted that it was valuable to have quantitative
reports of the pilot's impact. He believes the supplementary evaluations of the Alewife pilot
(Presented above) provide an argument for adding these resources to the Red Line
permanently. He was planning on using these analyses to make this case in his next budget
proposal.
After the pilot projects were extended beyond January, the OCC director asked if the reports
could be produced daily, indicating that he saw management value in them. The COO and
OCC director started getting daily performance reports for the Red, Blue, and Orange Lines
on March 25, 2013. This request represents a second-order impact of the pilot project
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strategy. The first is the actual improvements in service, while the second is an increased
institutional appetite for information and innovation.
The daily report provides additional quantitative information on service that OCC personnel
can relate to information about other circumstances such as track conditions, power
problems, disabled trains, medical emergencies, and other service disruptions. For example,
construction activity for a new station at Assembly Square on the Orange Line requires
trains to move at 10 miles-per-hour through a section of track where there were workers.
This shows up every weekday in the report: nearly all trains between Oak Grove and Sullivan
Square are counted as slow from 7:00 AM to 3:00 PM (construction hours) and total
passenger travel time increased. The OCC Director and COO have expressed frustration
that the capital construction department is not sensitive to the operational impacts of their
work, and are pleased to have a tool that quantifies customer impacts. Comparing the total
passenger travel time before and after construction started, construction is causing 675
customer-hours of delay per day. Figure 29 shows total customer-hours of travel time on the
Orange Line for weekdays since October 2012 to present, with a two-week moving average.
Construction started in February 2013. Since then, total travel time has trended higher.
Orange Line Total Passenger Travel Time
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Figure 29: Total customer-hours of travel time on the Orange Line
4/1/13 5/1/13
since October 2012
These cases suggest that the OCC has accepted and engaged with the reports as a tool to
communicate their experience with other departments. They can use them to make the case
for how the work of other departments impacts service and customers. This is an important
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role for perfonrance mifonnation that was not considered explicitly in the initial designs of
the performance reports.
In addition to seeing how outside circumstances affect performance, meetings with the
COO and OCC Director also showed that they can use them to identify issues with their
own management. After seeing performance information for multiple days, the COO noted
off-peak performance (midday and night) was unacceptable. He admitted that after the rush
hour ends, management pressure eases; less attention is paid to off-peak performance.
The implementation of the programs thus achieved two goals. The pilots have led to
operational changes that achieve improvements for passengers, though these do not
completely eliminate the problems they were targeting. Pilots also successfully engage MBTA
staff with performance information about the rail system. Gaining the trust of operations
personnel in the performance information has the possibility of producing additional service
improvements as managers see service quality regularly and work to improve it.
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Findings, Recommendations,
and Further Research
The process of generating performance information from automated data, arranging this
information into performance reports, and applying it to modify service provides important
lessons about performance measurement, reporting, and management. This chapter
summarizes and generalizes these lessons, and develops recommendations on how the
MBTA and other transit agencies can extract more value from their existing data.
This research provides several key findings about how to take ADCS data, translate it into
performance information that is useful for the people controlling service, and apply this
information to actually change service. These are summarized below and are discussed in
detail in the remainder of this chapter.
e Perspective matters: measuring from a customer perspective is a strong basis for
evaluating performance
* Process matters: developing measurements and reports in collaboration with service
controllers makes them more likely to understand, trust, and ultimately use the
information
* Design matters: performance reports should be comprehensive, concise and clear in
order to provide users with as much information as they need to understand service
while requiring little time and effort to read
- Collaboration on performance reporting facilitates introducing service changes
because it builds trust and support from both middle and upper management
- Collaboration also improves the substantive quality of the performance indicators by
incorporating the domain knowledge of employees
* Proposed service changes are more likely to be implemented when:
o They address recognized problems
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o They will reduce demands on service controllers' time
o They are easily reversible
o They have the potential to benefit a large number of customers and will be
visible to them
* Pilot projects and performance reports reinforce one another
o Pilots show how information can be applied to service
o Performance information shows the value of changes in service
* Performance information serves as a communications tool to address problems that
require coordination between departments
From these findings, this chapter goes on to make recommendations for how the MBTA
can expand the use of automated data and its impact on performance.
* Set performance goals for heavy rail based on the new metrics using historical
performance as a baseline from which to improve
e Publish performance information to customers more frequently and in more detail
than the current monthly and annual reports
* Reorient metrics for other modes - bus, light rail, and commuter rail - around
passengers
- Augment real-time information for heavy-rail operations control to display headways,
because this is how both the previous and new reports judged their work
* Engage additional staff such as inspectors in managing headways
e Analyze data at regular intervals to inform infrequent processes like scheduling or
fare policy changes
e Assess the customer impacts of unplanned disruptions to quantitatively evaluate
capital needs
e Assess the customer impact of scheduled service changes to improve planning for
construction and maintenance, sporting events, and special events
* Establish an institutional responsibility for applying data to operations in an
employee or office that acts as an internal consultant and coordinator of new
initiatives
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* Consider planning, and reporting uses of data when specifying and designing future
data systems
Finally this chapter proposes several areas for future research that were not addressed but
are important to more fully understand how to make automated data more effective.
- Expand to other modes of transit or other agencies
e Expand to dynamic, interactive information for consumption by the general public
* Explore alternatives to weighting performance by passenger volume
* Measure capacity and crowding
e Investigate dispatchers' reactions to different incentives and perspectives of
performance information, such as highlighting good rather than poor performance
* Research the impact of calculating performance metrics in real-time and displaying
them to dispatchers, rather than showing overall performance the next day.
6.1 Key Findings
By evaluating the existing performance reporting paradigm at the MBTA within the data-
information-knowledge-wisdom framework, this research makes several findings about
performance measurement. Applying these to develop new performance reports produces
additional conclusions about the influence of design on the communicative value of
information. Piloting operational changes based on new performance information provides
insight into the institutional process of data-driven innovation.
6.1.1 Perspective Matters
How an agency measures service determines what it knows and is therefore able to improve.
Evaluating MBTA performance under the current on-time performance standards versus
other measures such as big gaps, headway regularity, customers experiencing big gaps, and
travel time paint different pictures of service quality. While perhaps an obvious point, it
behooves transit agencies to consider the perspective they are taking when designing or
updating performance measurements. For the 8% of customers traveling to or from the
terminal on one of the Red Line's branches (the perspective implied by the current standard),
the MBTA's current performance is acceptable. For the 67% of riders only traveling on the
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trunk, however, it is irregular. Because this has not been measured previously, it is difficult
for the MBTA to address.
Incorporating information on customer demand and weighting performance on each
segment by the number of customers experiencing that quality of service creates a different
view of service that may imply alternative management strategies or areas of focus. For
example, given that most of Red Line ridership is on the trunk, the MBTA should strive to
maintain an even headway on this segment, rather than managing to branch headways. Even
trunk service will also result in even branch headways. The current practice of measuring the
performance with the train as the unit of analysis is a poor proxy for the primary purpose of
a transit system, which is to move people.
6.1.2 Process Matters
A collaborative, iterative design process that engages the eventual audience of the
performance information can guide the design to more effectively generate knowledge.
Knowledge is a property of people, not contained on a sheet of paper (Rowley 2007). If the
intention of the performance information is to generate knowledge - an understanding of
relationships that can be applied to affect service - then examining how people react to
different information is a critical part of the design process. Soliciting feedback from the
users of the information provides insight into what they are interpreting from it, which
determines what they can do with it. This may, however, create tension when designing a
report for multiple audiences, as they may have differing responses to the same information
and presentation techniques. Genuine collaboration respects and incorporates the opinions
and experience of service managers. In doing so, it improves their acceptance of the metrics,
since they know that their input was taken into consideration. Moreover, the collaborative
process incorporates the dispatchers' domain knowledge that is critical to making the reports
accurately represent service. Without such domain knowledge, the information represents an
outside perspective on service quality. Such engagement also emphasizes that performance
metrics are intended to be constructive and useful, not punitive.
Collaboration with internal stakeholders has been a labor-intensive undertaking, and
soliciting public input may be even more work. Putting this effort into developing reports,
however, ensures they are meaningful to operators and customers and enables a distributed
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knowledge generation model. This may reduce the amount of effort required to identify
service improvements in the future because multiple groups have good information from
which they can assess service.
6.1.3 Design Matters
Performance reports should be concise (one page, digital or physical was the standard in this
work), easy to read, and provide enough detailed information to base decisions on. They
should be as simple as possible, and no simpler. This provides additional justification for a
collaborative process to determine what elements are most communicative. Operations
personnel demonstrably do not have the time to seek out performance information from a
reporting system, given past experience. Managing performance is competing for their
attention with other aspects of service provision, such as addressing equipment failures,
labor and vehicle availability, and passenger incidents. While the MBTA's Smart Bus Mart
reporting system provides a flexible reporting tool for bus performance, managers and
dispatchers are mostly familiar with the Key Routes On-time Performance Report that is e-
mailed to them every day. Smart Bus Mart allows managers to investigate performance issues
or seek more detailed information, but this takes time away from actively managing the
service.
This creates a temptation to provide a wealth of information about service in a performance
report. While performance reports can certainly be information-rich, this also demands that
close attention is paid to information design. Excessive amounts of numbers or repeated
graphs can result in information fatigue that reduces the communicative power of the
reports to generate knowledge, as this research learned through the intermediate drafts of its
reports. Using graphics can be a useful technique for condensing information. The early
drafts of new performance reports included numbers that quantified the information in the
headway graph, but in conversations with OCC staff, it was clear that the graph was better at
communicating the headway performance.
6.1.4 Collaboration on Performance Information Builds Trust for Pilot Projects
Support from multiple levels of management is required to implement pilot projects, which
can be established through cooperation on the underlying performance analysis. This work
has explored the process of implementing changes based on performance information and
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analysis. This was made possible due to close coordination with MBTA staff, both in the
GM's office and in the OCC. Support from senior staff such as the Director of Innovation
and OCC Director was essential to getting approval from upper management to do pilot
projects. This aligns with Altshuler and Zegans' findings that "being close to clients and
relying on them to convey positive messages" facilitates change in bureaucratic agencies
(Altshuler and Zegans 1997, 78). The support of the OCC director was also critical in
building support among the dispatchers and other operations personnel to implement the
pilot projects effectively. Because the pilots were associated with the OCC director who
works closely with the dispatchers, they did not dismiss the projects as a micromanaging
directive. Instead, they accepted them as an opportunity to make their jobs easier.
6.1.5 Specific Characteristics of Pilot Projects Affect Their Viability
Pilot projects are more likely to be successful if they address recognized problems, reduce
the amount of work required by operations staff, are easily reversible, and have the potential
to benefit a large number of customers. This is consistent with Altshuler and Zegans' work,
which finds that addressing widely recognized problems and proceeding incrementally are
common elements of successful changes in public agencies (Altshuler and Zegans 1997). By
specifically targeting issues that were recognized as problems by dispatchers, the pilot
projects conveyed the value of measurements. They were presented as a tool to make their
jobs easier rather than as a report card that would be used to criticize their work.
The OCC was also open to the pilot projects because they were easily reversible if they
believed they were harming service to an unacceptable degree. This is part of the reason the
Braintree schedule change was tested out as a pilot first: if the change had a negative effect it
could be easily reversed. If the change had first been made in the official schedule, it would
have been locked in for the next three months. It was easier to pilot a change to an
operation like dispatching that occurs every day, rather than in an operation like scheduling
that happens every few months.
This work targeted the Red Line because it carries the most passengers out of the MBTA's
services, so it receives significant institutional attention. This bolstered internal support for
projects to address Red Line issues, particularly among upper management, because
improvements would have a large impact on customers and be visible if successful.
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6.1.6 Pilot Projects Build Support for Performance Information, and These Reinforce
One Another
Pilot projects based on analyses of performance information build support for and
acceptance of performance information in general. The close monitoring of pilot projects
using the performance reports enabled a quick evaluation of their effectiveness. It also
helped to familiarize staff with the performance information in a operational context. This
quantitative evidence of how things are working has been important for outside researchers
to gain credibility with the OCC staff and build support for future work. The positive
outcomes of the Braintree pilot built confidence in the accuracy of performance information
for operations personnel, which made the Alewife pilot possible. While this research did not
see pilot projects judged as failures, such cases may still have the benefit acquainting
operations staff with performance information.
The ability of pilot projects to disrupt the status quo and make people think critically about
service is an important part of their ability to influence service quality. Because turning trains
around quickly at Alewife required dispatchers and station managers to actively engage in
train departures, this added to the benefit of the pilot procedure. As the procedure has
become institutionalized, its performance benefits have diminished, in part due to less active
management of Alewife. Managers were also not receiving daily performance reports at the
beginning of the extended implementation. The lack of feedback information may have
contributed to the lower benefits at the start of the full implementation. After making
managers aware of the drop in time savings, performance has improved again, though not to
the level seen in the initial pilot.
This suggests that a mechanism to maintain a high degree of attention to service quality after
the novelty of a pilot procedure wears off is critical to maintaining the benefit of service
changes. Weekly performance reporting may be a part of this, providing managers with
regular insight into how their efforts are working while smoothing out day-to-day variations
in service. Making reports available to customers and to the general public also increases the
pressure for consistent high-quality service, though this work did not succeed at taking
performance information to this point.
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6.1.7 Performance Information is a Communication Tool
These projects also revealed that performance information can facilitate communication
between departments. It provides a common basis for identifying and discussing issues, as
demonstrated by the pilot to reschedule the Red Line branches. This requires that all parties
understand and accept the performance measurements. The existing OTP reports are limited
as a communication tool because dispatchers do not trust their information. Providing
measurements that conform to both dispatchers' and schedulers' understanding of service
has enabled a conversation about how to address issues, rather than disagreeing about
whether there were problems.
6.2 Recommendations for Expanding the Use of Automated Data and
Performance Information
As a result of this research, some MBTA operations managers are receiving daily
performance reports that incorporate customer information for the Red, Blue, and Orange
Lines. This is a significant change in the way the IMBTA understands service on these lines,
and has led to two successful pilot projects to improve quality. In addition to generating
better performance information, there are other applications of automated data that could
benefit the agency.
6.2.1 Set Goals for Passenger-Oriented Metrics
Firstly, as it has done with its other performance indicators, the MBTA should now set goals
for the passenger-centric performance metrics contained in the rapid transit daily reports.
Without goals, the power of the information to produce service improvements is limited.
These goals should be achievable or they may be ignored because operations personnel
cannot see progress towards them. This would be the reverse of the rail OTP reports, which
are ignored because service is never judged to be poor. Historical performance information
should be used to set goals that are better than the median of the distribution for each metric.
These should be revised upwards as performance improves at regular intervals, such as every
time the schedule is revised. This provides a basis for continued improvement in the service
experienced by customers.
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6.2.2 Re-orient Other Modes' Performance Around Customers
The MBTA should also re-orient performance metrics for other services like light rail, bus,
and commuter rail, around passengers. Because detailed O-D data for these modes is not yet
available, this requires rethinking how to incorporate passenger demand into performance
for these modes. This is also an area for future research.
6.2.3 Increase Real-Time Focus on Headway Management
The MBTA should also augment its real-time information to focus on headways for frequent
service. Both the old and new performance reports take the headway between trains as their
fundamental metric, but the rail dispatchers do not currently have headway information in
their standard system view. To manage service effectively, dispatchers need real-time
information about service in terms of the metnics used to judge performance, so headway
information should be displayed to heavy rail dispatchers. The MBTA should also engage
personnel such as inspectors in managing headways. Inspectors in rail stations have real-time
information on headways and could make adjustments to avoid bunches and big gaps.
Because inspectors do not see the entire system, the OCC would need to establish
parameters within which they could exercise control, such as restricting this practice to
certain stations at certain periods. Bus inspectors have access to handheld devices that
display information similar to what dispatchers see, which they should use to manage
headways from their station posts. Having multiple levels of management making service
adjustments requires clear and frequent communication between them to ensure that
operators are not given conflicting or redundant instructions. An alternative would be to
give operators information about the headways of their leader and follower and make it clear
that their duties include maintaining an even headway.
This focus could extend beyond management techniques to piloting new operational
procedures like those tested in this research. For example, the MBTA could attempt and
measure the impact of moving to drop-back scheduling. In a drop-back schedule, a new
driver switches onto a train at the terminal and the former driver "drops-back" and takes the
next train to pull in. This allows trains to pull out more quickly by overlapping the driver's
walking time with the headway.
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6.2.4 Analyze Automated Data Regularly
In addition to performance reporting and management, automated data should be analyzed
at regular intervals to inform other operational and policy decisions. In analyzing running
times on the Red Line, this research has reassessed an assumption that had not been
revisited for years. Automated data enables assumptions that go into scheduling to be
revisited every time a new schedule is produced, at little marginal cost. The MBTA is
currently doing this for bus scheduling through Hastus ATP, and should expand this
practice to its rail services.
6.2.5 Evaluate the Impact of and Response to Disruptions
Assessing the impacts of service disruptions is another potentially valuable application of
automated data. Combining performance information with records of unplanned disruptions
for equipment failures, signal and track problems, medical or security emergencies, allows
the MBTA to quantify the effects of these incidents on service. These quantifications can
help to make the case for capital investments and inform investment priorities. The Red and
Orange Lines suffer from disabled trains multiple times per week, if not once per day.
Calculating the number of passengers inconvenienced and the duration of the delays gives an
estimate of the passenger benefits of upgrading the rolling stock. A cost per passenger hour
saved could be a factor to consider in prioritizing capital and maintenance projects.
Following from the assessment of disruptions, the MBTA could also evaluate and improve
the strategies that it uses to recover from disruptions. Analyzing incidents both in terms of
their passenger impact and the speed and effectiveness of the recovery enables managers to
assess their efforts. In the case of disruptions, managers are focused on safely returning to
normal service. Maintaining service quality to the extent possible may be a secondary
objective, perhaps a distant one. As the performance reports did with normal service,
discussing the analysis of service responses may generate ideas for changes to procedures to
improve recovery. It may also enable strategies to be adapted to specific types of disruptions
by revealing performance differences between strategies that managers did not notice as they
were focusing on the incident. Such analysis would allow managers to augment their
standard operating procedures in the face of disruptions and reduce performance impacts.
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6.2.6 Evaluate the Impact of Scheduled Service Changes
Evaluating the customer impact of previous planned service disruptions for construction and
maintenance will allow the agency to understand their impact on service and customers. This
knowledge could be applied to improve planning for construction and maintenance in order
to minimize the impact on customers. One example is the daily delay for southbound
Orange Line trains between Wellington and Sullivan due to construction of the Assembly
Square station. Between 7:00 AM and 3:00 PM, all trains take at least 15% longer than
normal. Knowing that this causes 675 hours of passenger delay each day could provide an
impetus for switching to a night construction schedule (possibly 8:00 PM to 4:00 AM). This
information could be applied to evaluate the customer impact of other construction changes,
such as the impending closure of Government Center Station for rehabilitation. A second
example would be calculating the total delay created by the reconstruction of the Anderson
Bridge (connecting Cambridge to Allston near Harvard) that serves the #66 and #86 buses,
which could provide as a basis to design strategies to mitigate the problem. In cases like the
Anderson Bridge and other upcoming bridge reconstructions like the Longfellow, River
Street, and Western Avenue bridges, the construction is imposed by MassDOT.
Documenting the impacts to customers gives the MBTA leverage to request that MassDOT
arrange mitigation to avoid the impacts or compensate the MBTA and its customers.
6.2.7 Evaluate Performance During Special Events
The MIBTA should also evaluate its performance around sports and special events more
closely and make efforts to improve it where necessary. Many of these events occur during
off-peak and weekend times, when service levels are lower. Sports and special events
produce higher customer volumes that the schedule anticipates. The MBTA adjusts service
for New Year's Eve, Independence Day, and the Boston Marathon by providing rush-hour
service from the afternoon through close of service. Evaluating performance for other
sporting and special events would allow the MBTA to augment service in a more targeted
way that does not require as many resources but still provides capacity where needed.
Additionally, for some patrons, special events are their only experience on the MBTA.
Ensuring that these customers have a high-quality experience may improve their image of
the agency and support for transit.
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6.2.8 Make Performance Information Available Publicly
While passengers currently have some real-time information about service, more detailed
historic performance information should be made publicly available. Increasing transparency
about service quality augments the anecdotal impressions of service that currently form the
core of the public and political perception of the MBTA. Knowing that data is publicly
available also creates an additional incentive for operations personnel to maintain high
quality service. Both bus and rail dispatchers are sensitive to creating big gaps because they
often result in complaints from customers that are followed by inquiries from their managers.
Knowing that customers, advocacy groups, and the press can see more than just the service
they experience provides dispatchers with an additional incentive to be concerned with
overall service quality. Transit advocacy groups and interested individuals putting pressure
on top-level managers would filter down in the same way. Public performance information
may also depict MIBTA service to be better than some riders believe, counterbalancing their
anecdotal impressions of service with a broader perspective. This may generate positive
reinforcement and provides a similar incentive to maintain good service.
In making the reports public, the MBTA should solicit additional design input from a focus
group or other representatives of the public to ensure that the public-facing reports
communicate information effectively. As this research shows, the input of the eventual users
is critical to designing information that is comprehensible to them. The management
incentive of publicizing performance information, however, could be achieved by simply
publishing the current reports because dispatchers would know that their performance was
visible outside of the OCC. The effect may be limited if they are not understood by
advocates, however, since this limits their understanding of service and ability to express
concerns or commendations.
In adapting performance information for public consumption, the MBTA should include
indicators that distinguish between what is due to operations management and what is due to
circumstances outside of their purview. For example, information on equipment, signal
failures, and passenger incidents on the heavy rail system would qualify poor performance.
For buses, an indicator of traffic volumes or vehicle shortages due to shuttling would be
informative. Without such information, the public may blame the MBTA for service issues
that are outside its control. Displaying equipment and traffic issues could also create public
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pressure on other government bodies such as the state legislature or city traffic departments
to address these problems.
6.2.9 Establish Internal Responsibility for Applying Automated Data
If the MBTA intends to expand the application of performance information to impact
service, it should establish the institutional responsibility for doing so in an individual or
office. While the agency has the data it needs to implement these recommendations, it has
only re-oriented processes around the data as ad hoc projects like this research. The
experience of this work in piloting new operational strategies suggests several important
features for the institutional role of applying performance information to change practices at
the MBTA. Firstly, it should be located within an executive-level office (GM or COO) so
that it clearly has the institutional backing of upper management. The position should work
closely with the departments whose practices will be affected. This research worked closely
with the OCC, which has enabled it to incorporate their input into the analyses and to
overcome the distrust of outside analysis.
Such a position would operate like an internal consultant, with a dedicated role of examining
operations from a perspective that daily managers do not have time to consider. The
responsibilities of such a position should be to evaluate how the agency's operations could
be improved by analyzing its automated data, starting with those that are most visible to
customers. This employee or office would then work with the relevant department to ensure
that analyses are appropriately framed and do not leave out important factors. This would
allow them to produce recommendations about how to improve operations. Unlike external
consultants who leave after making recommendations, the internal position should then
coordinate the different departments and individuals whose cooperation is required to
implement the projects. This ensures continuity between the initial analyses that identify the
problems, the proposed solutions, and their implementation.
6.2.10 Consider Planning and Reporting Uses of Data in New Systems
The MBTA is preparing to track light rail vehicles more accurately as part of the Green Line
extension. In designing this vehicle tracking system, it should consider the historical and
reporting uses of the data in addition to the real-time display to controllers. The Green Line
poses particular issues due to its subway-to-surface operations that will require two separate
111
tracking mechanisms. The data from the two systems should be integrated into a single
database to facilitate performance measurement. Additionally, the real-time system should be
able to display both the joint headway and the headway for the specific branch. The MBTA
should also consider other operational issues it might want to capture, such as being stopped
at a traffic light versus at a stop. This example would require the tracking system to record
when velocity is zero and if the doors were open. Considering as many future uses as
possible when designing the Green Line tracking system may avoid some of the constraints
faced in this research.
6.3 Opportunities for Further Research
This work has used a case study of developing and applying performance information for
heavy rail transit at the MBTA to draw conclusions about the impact of process and design
on the effectiveness of the information. Further research could be conducted on what
elements of information design are most effective for other modes of transit, other agencies,
or for other sectors of the transportation industry.
6.3.1 Research the Developing Dynamic Information or For Multiple Audiences
This research was limited to generating static, non-interactive information. Additional
research should focus on the process and design of dynamic and interactive performance
information and how to apply it to service. The reports in this research have been designed
with input from a single audience - the MBTA's OCC managers and dispatchers. This group
has a fairly uniform understanding of service and background knowledge that has guided the
design of the reports. While some thought was given to comprehensibility for a general
audience, public input was not solicited. Future research should consider how to design
transit performance information for multiple, diverse audiences. Because they have differing
amounts of background knowledge and different interests in the information, this may imply
a alternate design processes, graphic techniques, media, or even different metrics.
6.3.2 Explore Alternate Approaches to Weighting Performance
The approach taken in this research to incorporate passenger information into performance
measurement weights performance based on customer demand. The implication here is that
the segments with the most passengers are the most important. In the peak periods, a
primary function of a transit system is to provide high capacity into dense employment areas
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like downtown business districts. In this scenario, weighting by passenger volume is
appropriate.
In other periods of the day or in other parts of a city, the primary function of the transit
network is providing mobility, not simply capacity. Weighting by passengers places a lower
priority on segments with lower demand and may hide poor performance on these segments.
Moreover, it does not take into account customer need. For example, the Ashmont branch
serves approximately half the number of customers as the Braintree branch, but many more
are transit-dependent. Whether a higher demand segment that serves mostly choice riders
should receive more weight than a lower-demand segment with more captive riders is a
subjective judgment. Likewise, in the off-peak periods, services run less frequently, so poor
performance may result in high total trip times, which is not taken into account by
measuring service on each route individually. Future research should consider how to
incorporate such concepts into performance metrics.
6.3.3 Estimating Crowding from Automated Data
The passenger weighting approach used in this research assumes that all passengers board
the first train that arrives. In the peak hours on the MBTA, this is inaccurate on its face -
trains reach capacity. Future research should explore how to identify vehicle crowding both
in real-time and in historical data. In the latter case, a gross measure of crowding comparing
total boardings to total capacity in a given period would allow service planning to know
where they needed to add service. This is likely possible with existing historical AFC data for
rail and passenger counter data for bus. Neither of these sources is available in real-time at
the MiBTA, so measuring crowding for operations purposes may be more challenging.
6.3.4 Explore the Impact of Different Types of Information on Management
Further research could also study what incentives different types of performance
information provide and how these influence dispatcher behavior. Much of this research
assumes that seeing a quantification of poor service provides an incentive to address its
causes, which in turn improves quality. Future work could evaluate if operations controllers
respond differently to metrics framed in other ways, such as positively oriented
measurements that focus on what is working well.
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This work could be extended to examine the impact of producing performance metrics in
real-time to provide immediate feedback to dispatchers and the public. While they currently
have real-time information on the state of the system, there could be an additional benefit to
evaluating the day's performance as it occurs, rather than viewing it in the past. This would
serve as a live score for the day's performance, a barometer that operations personnel are
able to affect in real time. Such a real-time quantification of overall performance may be
more effective in influencing dispatcher behavior in the moment, while daily reports are
more relevant for managers.
6.3.5 Incorporate Passenger Information Into Performance Metrics for Other Modes
As mentioned previously, incorporating passenger information into metrics for other modes
presents additional challenges. On many bus and light rail systems, passengers are only
recorded on entry. Headways can still be weighted by passenger arrivals, since these can be
estimated. Since passenger destinations are not known for these modes, slow trips cannot be
calculated for specific O-D pairs. Instead, a vehicle that takes longer than scheduled to run
its route could be weighted by the total number of customers boarding that vehicle, since
AFC records are linked to the vehicle for surface light rail and bus. MIT is currently working
on applying the methodology from Gordon (2012) to the MBTA, which would provide O-D
and transfers for its entire network. Success in this project would eliminate the need for
alternate methods of incorporating passenger information at the MBTA, though they may be
useful for other systems.
6.4 Final Thoughts
The opportunities for making powerful information out of simple spatiotemporal data for
vehicles and customers are wide ranging. Incorporating additional data such as traffic,
incidents, or disruptions adds another dimension to this data. These additional data sources
have the potential to increase the amount information and knowledge transit agencies have.
As the number of data sources and dimensions of analysis increases, so does the need for
collaborative information design. Adding more information adds new elements that a viewer
must interpret and relate. These tasks need to be considered and facilitated through design,
then verified through collaboration. This research suggests that the process of collaboration
is at least as important as the design itself in influencing the interpretation and responses of
viewers. As long as the eventual application of the information relies on human action,
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ensuring that end users can easily interpret the information is critical to enabling them to
apply it.
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Appendix A: Sample Existing Single
Bus Route OTP Report
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Route OTP Report
Route: 01
Page 1 of 4
Printed on 2/2512013
Periods: One Day: 0212212013 (Friday) martBusMart
Day type: All days
01 67 190
Startpoint Midpoint Endpoint
Late 14.4%
* Headway gap 3.4%
flOn time 77.9%
Early 4.3%
Total: 100.0%
Late 21.8%
* Headway gap 9.3%
On time 64.8%
* Early 4.0%
Total: 100.0%
Late 17.6%
STrip too slow 60%
* On time 68.5%@ Trip too fast 3.2%
Early 46%
Total: 100.0%
Inbound by variation
Variation 0%
01-
Outbound by variation
Variation 0%
01- 4'
Goal: 75%
Goal: 75%
100% Total known
927
100% Total known
951
123
Route
0
Route OTP Report
Route: 01
Page 2 of 4
Printed on 2/25/2013
Periods: One Day: 0212212013 (Friday) SmartBusMart
Day type: All days
Inbound by hour
Hour 0%
5.00
6.00
7.00
n_ _ _ _ _Goal: 75%
by hour
0% Goal- 75%
ME I
A1:
At
*1
100% Total known
22
38
55
64
52
46
38
40
37
42
37
55
48
45
74
47
42
42
45
41
17
100% Total known
11
30
57
58
67
52
40
37
39
38
34
47
43
49
67
58
50
41
43
44
36
10
124
8.00
9.00
10.00
11.00
12.00
13.00
14.00
15.00
16.00
17.00
18.00
19.00
20.00
21.00
22.00
23.00
2400
25.00
Outbound
Hour
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
9.00
10.00
11.00
1200
13.00
14.00
15.00
16.00
17.00
18.00
19.00
20.00
21.00
22.00
23.00
24.00
25.00
Route OTP Report
Route: 01
Page 3 of 4
Printed on 2r252013
Periods: One Day: 02/22/2013 (Friday) SmartBusMart
Day type: All days
Inbound by timepoint
Timepoint 0%
01: hhqat
02: maput
03: cntsq
04: mit
05: hvnes
06: masta
07: Wasma
08: Melwa
09: Dudtv
Outbound by timepoint
Timepoint 0%
01 Dudly
02 Metwa
03 Wasma
04 masta
05: hvnes
06: mit
07: cntsq
08: maDut
09: hhoat
_ _ _ _ _ _Goal: 75%
4
_ _ _ _Goal: 75%
I,
100% Total known
98
100
105
105
105
102
105
103
104
100% Total known
106
105
105
107
107
105
105
103
108
125
Route OTP Report
Route: 01
Page 4 of 4
Printed on 2/25/2013
SmartBusMart
Periods: One Day: 02/22/2013 (Friday)
Day type: All days
0% Goal: 75%
Cabot runs
Run
1009
1012
1017
1019
1023
1027
1036
1053
1057
1058
1070
1072
1076
1079
1080
1086
1096
1101
1104
1109
1116
1119
1124
1132
1149
1156
1160
1162
1167
1174
1176
1184
1186
9063
9065
9067
9101
9106
9108
49
m~m
6 1
126
100% Total known
63
36
72
36
63
35
72
53
54
53
26
54
54
19
54
36
12
36
45
58
88
79
58
47
36
52
54
20
98
27
72
70
81
24
36
a
34
31
32
Appendix B: Sample New Performance
Reports for Heavy Rail
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Daily Performance Red Line Monday, 05/20/13
Long Waits
2%
7K pax
0%
1 K pax
Passenger
Travel Time 2
-3%
-2.2K hrs
below median
Passenger
Wait Time 2
-2%
-0.4K hrs
below median
Companson to range for each metric over pror 6 months (red bar Is today. dark grey is worse than median, lght grey is better)
Headway Performance (measured at Park Street)
8.7 5.0 7.2 5.1 4.7
Avg Headway'
Diff from Published
8.1
+2.7 +0.5 +0.2 +0.6 -1.3 +2.1
5
0
5:00 6:00 7:00 8:00 9:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 20:0 21:00 22:00 23:00 0:00 1:00
67 5.0
+0.7 +0.5
7.0
+0.0
5.3 5.8
+0.8 -0.2
8.7
+2.7
5:00 6:00 7:00 8:00 9:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 2000 21:00 22:00 23:00 0:00 1:00
A Big Gaps # Ashmont Big Gap * Braintree Big Gap
Early AM AM Peak Midday PM Peak Eve Night
Running Time Performance by Segment
Alewife{
Central
Park Street
II
JFKUMassj
Ashiont
Br5tre
Southbound
It I 1 l 1 I [I .I 
U)
W)
1 4 I~ ILO
I iiito
11 1 1 I 1
Braintree
Ashmont
JFK/UMass
Park Street
Central
AlewifeI
Highlighted times are 15% higher than the median for the period
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11%
32K pax
Headway Big Gap 2X Headway
C
0
0Co
25
20
1
1f
'2520
E
15
10
0
Northbound
LOU
"I1
Al ~
CID
OD
The standard for a big gap is either 1 5 time nor 3 minutes greater than the scheduled headway whichever is lower
2 Passenger travei and wait time are based on average passenger demvand rates per period Le 18000 people entering a station during the peak< is a demand rate of
6000/h r o 
100/min which are further divided by destination The rate is multiplied by the headway of a train to get the number of people boarding that train and by its travel
time to get passenger tiravel time it does not account for people not being able to board a train due to crowding.
3. Weighted average headway accounts for the fact that fewer people end up experiencing a short headway than a long headway since fewer passengers arrive between
trains
11,
I 1 1111111
SDaily Performance Orange Line Monday, 05/20/13
25%
49K pax
Headway
Long Waits
9%
17K pax
Big Gap
2%
4K pax
2X Headway
Passenger
Travel Time2
+16%
+6K hrs
above median
Passenger
Wait Time2
+12%
+1.6K hrs
above median
Comparson to range for each metric over prior 6 months (red bar is today, dark grey is worse than dian lght grey is better)
Headway Performance (measured at Downtown Crossing)
14.4 7.2 9.5 9.8 9.9 10.7
+4.4 +2.2 +1.5 +4.8 -0.1 +0.7
0
5:00 6:00 7:00 8:00 9:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 0:00 1:00
11.8 8.7 9.1 8.4 12.8 11.1
0 +1.8 +3.7 +1.1 +3.4 +2.8 +1.1
5
0
5
0
5:00 600 7:00 800 9:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 2000 21:00 22:00 23:00 0:00 1:00
A Big Gaps
Early AM AM Peak Midday PM Peak Eve N ight
Running Time Performance by Segment
Oak Grove i Southbound
Suflivan 3q i 0 W i
Downtown
Crosing
Ruggles
Forest ililsi
Forest Hilts
Rugg[es
i
Dowintown
Crossing
Sulivan Sq
Oak Grove
Northbound
Aij rj
1 1 ilb I ii N
Highlighted times irt5 higheir than hiie meo dian or the pernod
1. The staldard lor a big gap) is oither 1 5 tirnl or 3 miiuei grei1aterf iian Hie scheduld headway, whiciever is lowetl
2 Pasener travel and wail lin ie based ol average passeigiie demand tale per period. Le. 18000 people entering a statio durinig the peak is a denrl
rate of 6000/li or 100/1i, which are furster divided ty desliiitinloi The mli is itilliplied by 11 lthiadway of a trail to got Ihe numbit i o peope boaiding that rin
and by its tvel mu' to gt passeInger travel tin. It does not account for people not being able to board a train due to crowding.
3Wieighted arvemg headwyiV ao unti ho tie tart that uewerppli ndp ex efriencng a shrl headway than a long hiadway since fewer passenr aive
btr.weei tr
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8 21
.C
=3
0
-0
0
Cl)
-0
0
0
z
Avg Headway
Diff. from Published
1
I
11
in
in
it)
in
I
I
Daily Performance Blue Line Monday, 05/20/13
Passenger Passenger
Long Waits Travel Time 2  Wait Time 2
8% 2% 0% +1% +3%
5K pax 1.3K pax 0.1K pax +0.1K hrs +0.1K hrs
Headway Big Gap 2X Headway above median above median
Companson to range for each netc over prior 6 months (red bar is today dark grey is orse than rmedian, light grey is better)
Headway Performance (measured at Airport) Avg Headwa y
Diff. from Published
8.1 4.8 9.4 5.3 8.6 11.3
25 -0.9 -0.2 +0.4 +0.3 -0.4 -1.7
- s20
o 'E
5
0
5:00 6:00 7:00 8:00 9:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 0:00 1:00
8.4 5.5 9.7 5.3 8.8 11.5
D 25-0 2 -0.6 +0.5 +0.7 +0.3 -0.2 -1.5C3 ~ 20
E 15
(10
LLJu
0
5:00 6:00 7:00 8:00 9:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 20;00 21:00 22:00 23:00 0:00 1:00
A Big Gaps
Early AM AM Peak Midday PM Peak Eve Night
Running Time Performance by Segment
Government
Wonderland Westbound Center Eastbound
Orient Movenck
Heights
Onent
Maverick &Heights
Government E Wonderland
Cantor
Highlighted times are 15% higher than the median for the period
I The standard for a big gap is either 1.5 taies or 3 minutes greater than the scheduled headway, whichever is lower
2. Passenger travel and wart time are based on average passenger demand rates per period. Ie. 18000 people entering a station during the peak is a demand
rate of 6000/hr or 1 00/min which are further divided by destination. The rate is multiplied by the headway of a train to get the number of people boarding that
train and by its travel time to get passenger travel time. It does not account for people not being able to board a train due to crowding.
3. Weighted average headway accounts for the fact that fewer people end up experiencing a short headway than a long headway, since fewer passengers
arrive between trains.
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